




LITTERA
SCRIPTA
MANET

THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES OF THE UNITED STATES

★ 1934 ★

~~RESTRICTED~~



ENGLISH COPY

THE POMERANIAN BATTLE

AND THE COMMAND IN THE EAST

~~REFERENCE COPY~~
~~TO BE DESTROYED WHEN NO LONGER NEEDED~~

OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

~~LIBRARY~~

HISTORICAL DIVISION

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE

FOREIGN MILITARY STUDIES BRANCH

Restricted Classification
Removed Per
Executive Order 10501

62 pages

~~RESTRICTED~~

D-189

D-025

Subject : A Gp "Weichsel" (13 Feb 45)
Title : Erste Aussprache mit SS Reichsführer Himmler
Author : No. 901
Sheets : 7
Analysis : In early Feb 45, Third Pz Army was transferred to A Gp "Weichsel" and the Army Commander reported to RF-SS Himmler near Prenzlau on 13 Feb 45. This report is a summary of the conversation. As such, it contains appreciable information about the situation of the Army Group on this date, and it also establishes that Himmler had previously explained to Hitler the gravity of the German situation and the weaknesses of the German conduct of the Russian War.
Circumstances : The report was prepared at PWE 8, Garmisch, Germany, under the supervision of 7734 EUCCOM Historical Detachment. The author withheld his name for security reasons. He is not known to have been materially aided by documents or by other prisoners.
Revd by 7734 : 25 Apr 47
Identifying No: D-025

This was originally considered to be the "original" of MS# D-025. Since that manuscript is in reality only part one of MS# D-189, this "original" is being filed with MS# D-189

MS # D-189

Erhard Raus
Generaloberst

THE POMERANIAN BATTLE AND THE COMMAND IN THE EAST

Historical Division
Headquarters
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE

THE POMERANIAN BATTLE AND THE COMMAND
IN THE EAST

Discussions with Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler and Report to the Fuehrer

Topic I

First Discussion

with

Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler

Toward the end of the disastrous operations in East Prussia, the staff of the Third Panzer Army and I were relieved from assignment and during 8 - 10 February 1945, we were transferred by boat and rail to RUMBELSBURG (Pomerania). There we were attached to Army Group Weichsel (Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler) but were not yet committed.

I immediately established personal contact with the Corps on the right of the Eleventh SS Panzer Army (Lieutenant General Steiner) and the Corps on the left wing on the Second Army (General Weise), both of which were engaged in bitter defensive fighting to the south of my headquarters. It was intended for the time being that these Corps be subordinated to my command as a new Army sector.

Shortly after arriving in RUMMELSBURG, I requested to be presented to the Army Group Commander, Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler, and be permitted to make my report to him. My appointment was made for 13 February 1945.

Late in the afternoon of 13 February, several technical staff officers and I arrived at Himmler's headquarters in a camp in the woods southwest of PRENZLAU. There I was given a thorough report on the situation and plans by the Army Group G-3, and then by orders from Himmler I was invited to have dinner with him (Himmler) and his closest assistants at 2000 hours. Himmler appeared promptly, received me, and introduced me to his associates. He was obviously in good spirits and carried on a lively conversation, touching upon no official matters. As he talked, he evinced a marked interest in the arts and sciences. The meal was simple but well prepared and served perfectly. Since guests were present, an exception was made and every one at the table was served one glass of red wine. Himmler himself drank only mineral water. An hour later Himmler rose from the table and arranged to meet me for a discussion at 2230 in the office at his quarters. I was with Himmler at the appointed hour and there I met his Chief of Staff, SS Lieutenant General Lammerding. The con-

ference, originally planned for only half an hour, was prolonged by Himmler to 0300 because of my lengthy report and thus lasted four and a half hours. Lammerding was present only until about midnight and then because of the heavy air raid at DRESDEN he received permission from Himmler to leave and visit his family residing there. Consequently from approximately midnight to the end of the discussion, I was alone with Himmler.

To this very day I remember in detail the conversation given below. Also I am still able to repeat word for word Himmler's main remarks and questions as well as my replies. It is all the more simple for me since on returning to RUMMELSBURG, I immediately informed my Chief of Staff, Brigadier General Mueller-Hillebrand, about the conversation and also because later I often discussed the outcome of the conversation with others.

Himmler:

As you have been informed by my G-3, the Eleventh SS Panzer Army, together with other SS armored divisions and SS armored infantry divisions which have been brought up, will break through to the south from the area southwest of STARGARD the day after tomorrow and

attack the Soviet Armies, flanking KUESTRIN, from the rear and annihilate them. "The Fuehrer expects decisive results for the outcome of the war from this attack". Originally I had planned to place you, an experienced armored-force commander, in charge of this mission. Unfortunately it was not possible to obtain your release from East Prussia in time. My suggestion of postponing the attack so that assembly of forces could be completed stopped, and that you and your staff might still be integrated was reflected by the Fuehrer. Give me your honest opinion as to the course of action and the chances of success in this offensive.

I:

A comparison of strength of both sides (our one reinforced Panzer Army as opposed to the three Russian Panzer Armies and three to four Infantry Armies) is sufficient to conclude that the attack can lead only to failure. By achieving better coordination of our own units and by selecting a shorter route for the attack

by your armored divisions, perhaps some ground may be gained at one point or another, but then they will come to a standstill. "Under no circumstances, however, can a decisive result be expected".

Himmler:

(visibly affected by this adverse opinion) asked me to be just as frank in telling him what I would do in his place.

I:

Do not attack, but hold the armored units which have been moved up in readiness to definitely repulse the impending enemy attack. After the attack has been warded off successfully I would improve the contour of our line through a counter attack so that we would be able to hold our position against all future enemy attacks. (Additional reasons were cited in a lengthy discussion on this point.)

Himmler:

That is out of the question. The Fuehrer has given orders for the attack and will not change

his mind. For that reason the attack will be launched under any circumstances. I intend to discuss your proposals as to a more efficient execution of the attack with Guderian. (Himmler then summoned General Guderian by telephone to come to him from Zossen immediately).

I:

(After I had again given reasons for my opinion and very firmly suggested not to carry out the attack): I am convinced that the attack will have come to a standstill by the second day. In that event, I recommend that you no longer fight uselessly but halt the attack immediately and withdraw strong reserves for the defense against the Soviet counterattack, which can definitely be expected. However, under no circumstances can these reserves be transferred to another theater before the defense against the counterattack has succeeded, since that would bring about the collapse of your army group. (Detailed dialogue. Himmler was convinced by this evaluation).

Himmler:

Then, apparently to arouse my enthusiasm, told me confidentially that at approximately the same time Army Group South, together with the Sixth SS Panzer Army and other forces flanking Lake BALATON, would launch a large-scale attack against the Soviet Armies, poised for an assault on VIENNA, and recapture of BUDAPEST.

I:

Judging from my experience, I did not encourage him in any expectations of success even in this assault, because our forces were too weak and the Sixth SS Panzer Army would be exposed to the danger of being cut off and annihilated at Lake BALATON. (I also recommended that the same procedure be followed in this case that I had advised for Pomerania, and added that success could be gained only if it were possible to weld the Sixth SS Panzer Army and the Eleventh SS Panzer Army as well as all other available forces into one force and use it in one of the two sectors.)

Himmler:

In the course of quite lengthy discussion pointed out that the over-all situation would not permit such a concentration of forces, and clung to his belief that these two offensives would decide the outcome of the war.

I:

When the conversation turned to the subject of the over-all situation, I seized the opportunity of speaking about the serious miscalculations made by the Supreme Command and their consequences. About this time, there was a short pause while Lammerding left for DRESDEN for the reasons mentioned above. (The discussion continued now only between Himmler and me). "Herr Reichsfuehrer, permit me to make use of this first opportunity of being able to speak to you, the most influential individual in the nation next to the Fuehrer, in order to tell you in all frankness what I think about the manner in which the war has been conducted during the last few years and the situation as a result thereof. I know

that my statements could take me to the Moabit Prison and perhaps even to the gallows, but I shall not be able to vindicate myself before God and the German people if I remain silent on the subject."

Himmler (seriously):

"Proceed."

I:

Since STALINGRAD our conduct of operations has created serious doubts in the minds of commanders of all grades and during the last months cannot be understood at all.

"From the standpoint of space alone, it is clear that the advance of the German Army as far as the Volga and the CAUCASUS and the resulting defensive operations along a 3000 km long front exceeded the capacity of the German Armed Forces and the German Allied forces. The bow was strained to the utmost and had to break. The strength-consuming fighting around STALINGRAD and on the DON and the ramifications of these actions led to a military defeat of gigantic proportions. Two-thirds of the Eastern

Front began to totter, the allied forces were crushed and swept away, and a complete collapse of the Front became apparent. The catastrophe was prevented only by the miraculous courage and tenacity of the German commanders and troops and by the exertion of every ounce of strength.

"The Supreme Command did not deduct the inevitable inferences from these facts, but issued orders with increasing obstinacy and stubbornness which led to the elimination and destruction of numerous large and very large units. This unsystematic robbery gnawed at the very marrow of German combat strength has brought us to the edge of the abyss into which we are in danger of being hurled unless those miracles occur which our people have been led to expect. The Supreme Command has lost all concept for time and space, and the relationship with military strength, and is leading the subordinate Army commanders by the nose in such a way that they are able to issue orders only with hands tied and a rope dangling above their heads since they have to carry out

orders under penalty of death, and in return are driven away in shame and condemned as traitors to their country if the result of the battle is unfavorable".

(I paused here in expectation of a contradictory utterance from Himmler or my immediate arrest. Neither of these two took place).

Himmler:

(unmoved, looked me squarely in the eyes and said): "Continue".

I:

(now began to substantiate my views with examples):

- a. Instead of organizing an aggressive strategic defense in suitable sectors selected well in advance, the Command was unwilling to surrender as much as one kilometer of space.
- b. Every reserve which had become available anywhere was immediately committed in local offensive operations which failed because they were carried out with inadequate resources and a result in addition to loss of ground, employment of these forces was without gain.

(Reference is made to the pincer attack against KURSK, July 1943, to the counter-attack against KIEV, and the plans in Pomerania and Hungary).

c. Construction of rear positions had been prohibited for a long time since allegedly units looked toward the rear and consequently did not present strong enough resistance. The result was exactly the opposite. Example: - during the withdrawal to the DNEJPR even hastily prepared positions were of enormous value. However, on the DNEJPR almost no preparations had been made and consequently the enemy reached the opposite bank within a short period and neutralized this water barrier. Troops felt bitter disappointment and their misgivings toward the (Supreme) Command grow. To be sure there were considerable preparations in East Prussia, however the badly debilitated Army no longer had enough strength to occupy and hold the positions.

d. Local strong points and so-called "centers of resistance" were emergency measures which, however, through stubborn resistance even in

a hopeless situation led not only to the loss of the places, but also to the loss of the unit and its confidence in the Command.

e. Improperly integrated or encircled and strength-consuming sectors had to be held at any cost and ate-up troop units or led to that loss.

f. Entire Armies were left to the defense of areas until they were encircled and for that reason did not play a role in the main theater of the war (CAUCASUS, CRIMEA, Army Group "North" in Courland, and the Fourth Army in East Prussia). The same catastrophic situation is in store in the case of Pomerania and Hungary if the planned operation is carried out.

g. The new units, constantly coming from nowhere, are not given adequate training, equipment and lack of time to mould themselves into a team. Of necessity they are thrown into gaps and in the course of large-scale fighting to which they are not accustomed melt like snow in the heat of the sun.

h. Enemy air action is inflicting such enormous damage at home that very important war material

does not reach the front at all or only in extremely inadequate amounts. (I referred to the repeated difficulties concerning chiefly ammunition, machine guns, rifles, anti-tank guns, tanks, assault guns, spare parts as well as fuel for motor vehicles, etc.)

I concluded the report by once more calling attention to the fact that in conducting the war in such manner, men, equipment, and terrain were lost to such an extent that Germany is in very grave danger. With this threatening situation on all fronts, decisive results are expected by the nations governments. I now remained silent as we looked at one another for a while without uttering a word.

Himmler:

(then moved closer to me, bent over and spoke slowly in a subdued voice enunciating every word): "I agree with you". (Himmler was silent again then).

I:

(surprised by this reply and after drawing a long breath I asked): "Why did you not inform the Fuehrer then?"

Himmler:

(after a short pause): "I expected this question." (another pause, then he continued): "I have already told the Fuehrer all of these things."

I:

"And what did the Fuehrer say?"

Himmler:

(pointing his finger, replies after a short time in a raised voice): "The Fuehrer replied most violently: 'You are a defeatist, too!' and in a fit of rage showed me the door."

I:

(This incident was continued some time later by Major General Kienzel, the last military expert detailed to Himmler by OKH, and who was present during that discussion between Himmler and Hitler).

Himmler:

(then described the difficulties at his front and the bitter fighting for the 'centers of

resistance' MARIENBURG and SCHNEIDEMUEHL.
He was particularly worried about the latter, since the loss of SCHNEIDEMUEHL - bitterly contested - was imminent and because he knew Colonel Remlinger, the local commander personally. Remlinger had only several hundred men left and scarcely any ammunition. Hitler did not reply to Remlinger's request for permission to break out with the remainder of the garrison).

I:

(Once more brought the conversation to the subject of the great danger which presently threatened the Army Group "Weichsel," and brought out a map (sketch 1) indicating the following enemy intentions on the Pomeranian Front:

At the outset the enemy will probably break through the front at its weakest point toward the Second Army and in an assault via KOESLIN cut off contact with the Second Army in order to isolate it. Then strong breakthrough attacks on one flank toward DANZIG

and on the other flank toward SRETTIN via STARGARD have to be taken into account. Both attacks will attempt to split up and annihilate the Armies in these areas.

These statements were interrupted by an urgent telephone call from the G-3 of the Army Group. A radio message from Colonel Remlinger to Himmler was relayed, concerning a successful breakout in a northerly direction toward his own front on the part of Remlinger and the remainder of his garrison. The breakout was made on Remlinger's own initiative since up to this time he had waited in vain for the requested permission).

Himmler:

(listened intently, then placed down the receiver, jumped up and with joyful enthusiasm paced back and forth as he repeatedly shouted to me): "Did you hear that? Remlinger made it! Remlinger made it! He did exactly right! I say he did exactly right!"

I:

(agreed with Remlinger's independent decision and voiced the hope that a large number of

these courageous men - favored by the densely wooded terrain - would be able to reach our own lines.

While we were still talking at length regarding the possibilities of aiding the unit which had broken out, the telephone rang again. I listened in on the order from Hitler transmitted through OKH ordering Remlinger, together with his garrison, to return to the 'center of resistance' immediately and continue its defense).

Himmler:

"You are absolutely right. I shall not forward this order".

I:

(This incident confirmed my belief that Himmler was not tricking me, but that he was serious when he agreed with my contentions).

Topic 2

Second Discussion

with

Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler

(7 March 1945)

A short time after my first discussion with Reichs-

fuehrer SS Himmler, the Eleventh Panzer Army launched the offensive as ordered by the Fuehrer. After achieving insignificant initial success it came to a standstill on the second day with the loss of many of our tanks.

In spite of my emphatic warning (see First Discussion with Himmler) all of the SS armored divisions and SS armored infantry divisions which had been moved up for this offensive, were drawn out of the Front and transferred to the Silesian-Saxony area of operations regardless of the fact that far superior Soviet forces were ready to launch a counteroffensive.

When the front had been unjustifiably weakened by this measure, I received the order from Army Group "W" to relieve then the commander in chief of the Eleventh SS Panzer Army (SS Lieutenant General Obergruppenfuehrer Steiner) and together with my staff (Third Panzer Army) take over the command of the remaining weak forces for the defense of the wide sector.

On 22 February - 2400 hours after assuming command - the Soviet Armies, in overpowering strength, launched the expected counteroffensive. This attack sealed the fate of Pomerania.

After the crumbled line had been reestablished on

the OBER, despite very heavy losses and thanks to the unequalled courage of the troops, I was again summoned to a conference with Himmler on 7 March. It took place in the Hohenlychen Sanatorium (northeast of BERLIN) where Himmler lay ill with angina. Accompanied by his aide, I arrived there at approximately three o'clock in the afternoon. On entering, Himmler raised up partially in bed, greeted me in a friendly manner and offered me a chair near his bed. His aide left the room and we were alone. The following conversation lasted over an hour.

Himmler:

"You have passed through some very difficult days, but in spite of all obstacles you have again stabilized the front!"

I:

(reported on the course of the fighting and constantly referred to the fact that, in the face of my recommendations, all reserves were withdrawn and transferred from the front. Consequently, the front, now weakened to the utmost, was attacked and smashed by the ene-

my's counteroffensive as expected).

"Moreover in the course of the enemy offensive you repeatedly issued orders which prevented me from acting along lines demanded by the situation. For example, you forbade the withdrawal of protruding sectors to favorably located and well prepared positions along shorter lines at the lakes. In that way, unnecessary losses could have been avoided and forces could have been released for the creation of reserves. (PURITZ, STARGARD, and NEUSTETTIN). These forces would have been adequate to seal off the initial penetrations. But, the enemy achieved deep penetrations at NEUSTETTIN and in the area east of STARGARD and we found ourselves short of troops required to contain the pressure. The one reserve unit (armored infantry division - "Holstein"), which I organized by weakening even the attacked sectors of the front had to be committed in accordance with your orders toward RUMMELSBURG via BUBLITZ with the hopeless task of establishing contact with the Second Army. And, in so

doing, the unit was needlessly exhausted. Later, it was unavailable at the point of main effort east of STARGARD where the 5th Jaeger Division was overpowered and split after waging an extremely courageous defensive battle against superior armored units in the ratio of 20 to 1. The bulk of the X SS Panzer Corps and the Corps Tettau, which were fighting in the area between the two points of penetration were thus in danger of being encircled and annihilated. With respect to this constantly increasing danger, I requested permission during a period of five days, each day more urgently, finally imploring you to grant my request, to pull the forces out of this threatened area at the nighttime to prevent their encirclement, since they would otherwise be sacrificed to no purpose. Even then you did not agree the withdrawal, but instead you added special emphasis to the disapproval by threatening a courtmartial action against all key officers. As a result, both Corps with the exception of a few elements of the Corps Tettau which may still be able to

fight their way back, were captured on the fifth day. These staggering events led to the rapid loss of Pomerania as far as the ODER where the remnants of the Army were again able to organize into a unit and occupy positions for successful defense. Effectively supported by navy and air force units fighting on the ground, it also became possible for the infantry to hold on to a series of important bridgeheads on the east bank of the ODER.

Since the two Corps were already encircled, the 10th SS Panzer Division "Fruntsberg", ordered to return from Silesia at the time, was now to reestablish contact with Second Army squeezed within a small area in the DANZIG-GOTENHAFEN district, by attacking across Pomerania which was already occupied by a number of enemy armored and infantry armies. It was altogether impossible to carry out this mission, and served to demonstrate to what extent you and the Supreme Command had misjudged the existing situation. Even the fact that Army Group neglected to have someone establish personal contact with

the Third Panzer Army, which was struggling in a desperate situation, cannot make it clear why that command by issuing rigidly binding orders and threats, made demands that could not be complied with and crippled the command of the Army.

Himmler:

(listens to these remarks in a serious and attentive manner and then replied):

"I know that you understood the actual danger in the Pomeranian Front and predicted these events in advance".

I:

"It is not a question of a prediction. I am thoroughly convinced that every other experienced army commander would have evaluated the situations in precisely the same manner and would have made the same recommendations to you".

Himmler:

"I have supported your proposals every time and have forwarded them to the OKH because the Fuehrer has reserved the right to make every decision himself. The Fuehrer, how-

ever, always rejected these proposals very emphatically and reproved me severely".

I:

"As you admitted yourself during our first discussion, such action is really contrary to the interests of our people for which we are all fighting and to whom the Fuehrer too is responsible".

Himmler:

"You are right, but the Fuehrer is convinced that he is doing the right thing, and for that reason demands, with unrelenting harshness, the execution of his orders. He tolerates no opposition and as a result rejects every recommendation which does not conform to his way of thinking".

I:

(in a raised voice): "But you should not accept a refusal if your convictions differ. Otherwise such action will lead to a disastrous end".

Himmler:

"Calm down. There will be a turning point soon. We shall win the war".

I:

"That does not make sense to me. I do not follow you".

Himmler:

(ends the conversation there and orders two cups of tea and rolls. Then he asked me to describe such actions to him which would show that the unit fought courageously and carried out the orders to the letter. Both the Fuehrer and he placed extremely high value on these points. The tactical reports did not reveal these facts to any degree and are much too cut and dried).

I:

(describe a number of incidents, most from personal experience in the Pomeranian operation, which revealed conclusively the courage and sacrifice displayed by the troops¹.)

¹ These incidents are contained in my report to the Fuehrer of 8 March 1945.

Himmler:

(listened with close attention and showed great excitement. After finishing my description of the fighting, Himmler sat up in bed, pressed my hand and enthusiastically exclaimed): "That was excellent. You should report that to the Fuehrer personally! Are you prepared to do so?"

I:

"Very much so. I was about to ask your permission to report personally to the Fuehrer on the heavy fateful battle for Pomerania."

Himmler:

(in my presence immediately called the Fuehrer's headquarters and asked to be connected with the Fuehrer. After only two or three minutes Hitler answered. His voice sounded monotonous and weary but could be heard plainly.):

"My Fuehrer, the commander of the Third Panzer Army is here beside me and has just now reported in detail on the Pomeranian Battle. The report was very interesting - you ought

to hear it yourself. May I send the General to you?"

Hitler:

"Yes, have him come tomorrow. I am having a conference tomorrow afternoon which will also be attended by all my principal staff members. They can listen to him at the same time".

Himmler:

"Very good. When shall he come?"

Hitler:

"He is to be here at the Bunker tomorrow afternoon at 4:00 o'clock. He will deliver his report after the conference".

Himmler:

"Good, the General will be there punctually".
(That ended the conversation between Himmler and Hitler and also my discussion with Himmler).

Topic 3Report to the Fuehrer
8 March 1945

(written from memory)

Preface: [Introduction]

As agreed by telephone between Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler and the Fuehrer on the occasion of my second discussion with Himmler in HOHENLYCHEN, I arrived on 8 March from my command post in STETTIN (Artillery Barracks). I arrived at the Reich Chancellery by car at 1600 to deliver my report on the battle of Pomerania. The report was made in the Fuehrer's Bunker, located in a small garden on the grounds near the Reich Chancellery.

After repeatedly checking my identification, an SS officer escorted me down allong stairway into the spacious hall, deep, underground, of the Bunker. On both sides of the hall, doors opened into the various conference and work rooms. All the rooms were tiled in white and olive green, well-lighted and simply furnished. At the moment, a number of generals who had arrived for the conference were gathering in front of the Fuehrer's door. I was speaking with several of the men with whom I was acquainted when an SS Lieutenant Colonel stepped up to me and asked me to come

with him for a moment. He led me into an adjoining room and courteously informed me that he would have to search me thoroughly. He did not accept my objection that I was the Commanding General of the Third Panzer Army who had been ordered here by the Fuehrer and that I had already established my identity more than once. He searched my pockets and clothing thoroughly. I was permitted to go then and I was free to return to the hall where I again joined the general officers who had come for the conference.

General Conference

As the officers of the Fuehrer's Staff were invited into the adjoining Fuehrer's room for the conference soon afterward, I joined other officers who did not participate in it, as a listener. The conference revolved around the events of the past days which were reported on with the aid of maps, first on the West Front and then on the East Front by the respective chiefs of staff. The Fuehrer sat at a table, bent over the maps, and followed the review of the operations. Most of the others present remained standing as they listened to the report. Hitler raised brief objections only now and then and did not enlarge techni-

cal details until later. However, to my knowledge no deliberations were engaged in, no recommendations were made and no decisions were made in spite of the grave tactical situation at that time in the west (crossing of the RHINE) and in the east (Soviets advancing into Silesia and Hungary).

After this conference, the Fuehrer together with the Chiefs of the various components of the Armed Forces and his inner circle remained in the conference chamber. All the others left. A short time later, I was summoned to this chamber for the report to the Fuehrer.

Report to the Fuehrer

Aside from Hitler, those present were: Reichsmarshal Hermann Goering, Field Marshal Keitel, Admiral Doenitz, General Jodl, General Guderian, Reichsleiter Bormann and Lt. Gen. Gen. d. Infantry Burgdorf and their chiefs of staff. They sat around a long table covered with maps. I stepped up to the Fuehrer, greeted him and handed him two situation maps. The first one of 13 February 1945 of the Eleventh SS Panzer Army (SS Lieutenant General Steiner) indicated the estimate of enemy intention, as cited during my

first discussion with Himmler, and the second showed the actual development of the all-out Russian offensive against the sector of the above-mentioned Army, over which, together with the Staff of the Third Panzer Army, I had assumed command. (Sketch 1 and 2)

The Fuehrer glanced distrustfully at me over his glasses and muttered something to himself which sounded like: "That should not have happened". He then took the maps into his very trembling hands and, comparing them, contemplated first one situation and then the other which essentially were the same. I faced a physically broken-down, embittered, and suspicious man whom I scarcely recognized. The knowledge that Adolf Hitler - now only a human wreck - held the fate of the German people in his hands alone was a deep shock to me.

Without returning my greeting and visibly angry, he said: "Proceed!"

Preparation of the Defense

In my introduction, I pointed out that I took over the command of the sector of the Eleventh SS Panzer Army from Lieutenant General Steiner only 24 hours before the all-out Soviet attack was launched

and for that reason had no opportunity to make any kind of decisive changes in the inadequate defensive scheme. I was even more handicapped because when I took over the command did not have any reserves at its disposal as all of the armored divisions, having been withdrawn from the front after Steiner's frustrated offensive, had been transferred to another theater. However, even during those few hours, it was still possible for me to regroup the 5th Jaeger Division (a unit with the highest degree of offensive capabilities) along a narrow front disposed in depth in the sector east of STARGARD where the major actions would probably be fought, and employ it in such a manner that with the support of tanks, antitank defense, and the bulk of artillery, deployed in depth, it would be able to temporarily hold its ground even in the face of a powerful enemy attack. Moreover, even before I took over command, I had issued orders for the construction of a dense network of tank obstacles in the Army rear area which abounded in wooded areas and bodies of water and thus lent itself well for this purpose. In a few days with the energetic cooperation of party members and local inhabitants, obstacles sprang up on

all bridges, village entrances, by-passes, as well as at highway and road entrances leading into woods or swampy terrain. These barriers were guarded by stout-hearted members of the Volksturm who had been trained in the use of the bazooka. Moreover, men equipped with antitank weapons were held in readiness with bicycles and motorcycles for mobile employment and for establishment of strong points. The entire civilian telephone network was put into service for the purpose of issuing tank warnings and to maintain communication between the blocked zones and with the military authorities. Never before had an area been transformed into such a tightly meshed antitank obstacle within so short a period of time as had been accomplished in Pomerania. The aim of this measure was to prevent enemy tanks which had broken through from carrying out a surprise advance or at least to delay it.

These precautions turned out very satisfactorily as I will describe in detail by enumerate several incidents later on. These measures, however, represented only a fraction of the precautionary measures which would have been required in order to offer successful resistance against the large-scale enemy attack.

Situation and Forces

At the time my headquarters assumed command of the Eleventh SS Panzer Army, the Army consisted of the III SS Panzer Corps with three SS armored infantry divisions. These had been considerably weakened a short time before in an unsuccessful attack. In addition it controlled the X SS Panzer Corps with two army infantry divisions in the center of the front, the Corps "Hoernlein" with replacement troops from the military district of STETTIN and one air force field division (fighting as ground force with the Army) on the right flank, and the Corps "Tettau" with the division "Baerwalde" formed from the school units from GROSSBORN and HAMMERSTEIN training centers on the left flank. The second division "Pomerania" in the Corps "Tettau" was composed of Volksgrenadier battalions and improvised units which were hastily organized from construction and survey battalions as well as supply units of all three components of the Armed Forces. This division contained neither a signal battalion nor artillery nor antitank weapons. Several recently formed regiments and battalions, in fact, lacked regimental and battalion commanders which I assigned from troops returning from leave to Army Group Cour-

land as they passed by me on the highway. I immediately sent them, in my car, to the units already engaged in fighting as their commanders. Division "Pomerania" occupied a switch position which extended along the left boundary of the Army perpendicularly to the front (old Pomeranian position against the Poles).

Altogether 8 divisions with 70 tanks occupied a defensive front of 240 kilometers. Accordingly, each division had to hold an average frontage of 30 kilometers.

							1 artillery piece
							1 heavy machine gun
							2 light machine guns
							40 men
2½	"	"	"	"	"	"	1 antitank gun
4	"	"	"	"	"	"	1 tank
6	"	"	"	"	"	"	1 battalion

Facing this line, the enemy had concentrated

3 Armored Armies comprising 8 Armored Corps

5 Infantry Armies comprising 15 Corps

and 1 Cavalry Corps

My Army of 4 Corps and 70 tanks consequently faced a total of 8 enemy Armies of 24 Corps and 1600 tanks.

Here the Fuehrer interrupted me in a reproachful voice with the words: "The enemy did not have 1600 tanks but only 1400". I pointed out that aside from the 8 newly constituted Russian Armored Corps, at almost full strength, there were also separate armored units operating in conjunction with the Cavalry Corps. Hitler acknowledged by a nod of his head that he would not dispute my objection.

Course of Battle:

Now I began the review of the tactical operations of the "Pomeranian battle". From the orientation given me by my predecessor about the enemy and from observations during the last 24 hours, I concluded that an all-out enemy offensive was imminent. Initially, preparations for an attack were observed in two places (on the boundary toward the Second Army and in the area east of STARGARD), and later also at a point south of STETTIN (GREIFENHAGEN). Particularly extensive concentration of tanks and infantry units were determined east of STARGARD. During the last few days southeast of NEUSTETTIN close to the boundary of Second Army, the enemy had conducted aggressive reconnaissance in force, which, stopped later on. During these actions

the first prisoners of the First Polish Army under Russian command, were brought in. This fact together with the comparative calm, led to the conclusion that a large-scale attack was not to be expected at this point. The neighboring forces to the left (Second Army) also did not observe any disturbing enemy activity to the front of their right wing.

By noon of 22 February 1945, however, I suddenly received a message from my left wing that the enemy had broken through in the area of the adjoining division (Charlemagne) of Second Army and that enemy tanks were rapidly driving toward northwest by way of STEGERS. During the afternoon, approximately 15 Russian tanks coming from the area of the Second Army, actually appeared at the outskirts of BALDENBURG. This was 35 kilometers to the rear of my Army's left wing. They were stopped at the tank barriers by elements of the Pomeranian Division after three tanks were knocked out. After being considerably reinforced during the night of 23 February, the enemy again attacked BALDENBURG the next morning with approximately 35 to 40 tanks and 1 or 2 battalions of motorized infantry. These enemy forces overpowered the garrison there of 60 construction engineers and naval surveying personnel,

broke through the switch position and pushed cautiously forward in the direction of BUBLITZ. The weak local garrison there (service troops of the Pomeranian Division), assigned to man the tank barriers, together with mobile tank destroyers, moved up from the surrounding woods and successfully attacked the enemy. Consequently, his action was confined to keeping the railway station under fire, but he did not attempt an attack against the town. Not until 24 February and after bitter fighting did the enemy enter the north section of the town and occupy the railway station. In the course of this action 16 tanks were destroyed by Panzerfausts. In the meantime powerful forces had been moved up in support of this enemy spearhead and forced the remnants of the penetrated adjacent wing (Division Charlemagne and the 15th Latvian SS Division) into my Army sector where they caused unrest among the improvised units, of the Pomeranian Division whose morale was low anyway. Moreover Russian troops who had followed the treks of German refugees, had penetrated NEUSTETTIN and had occupied the railway station of the city (approximately 20 kilometers in the rear of our own front). They could only be dislodged from the city after severe street fighting.

Since the Second Army together with the forces (7th Armored Divisions and infantry) which had been moved up via RUMMELSBURG had failed in their effort to block off the penetration on their front at STEGERS, more and more enemy units advanced deep into the flanks of my Army. My own flank thus became enveloped and was pushed back toward NEUSTETTIN. Enemy pressure also became constantly stronger in the area between this town and BUBLITZ. Contact with the Second Army was completely cut off by the armored assault which has pushed forward from BUBLITZ toward the heights east of KOESLIN. The ordered attempt to reestablish contact with the Second Army by employing the SS Armored Infantry Division "Holstein", which had just been drawn out of the line south of STARGARD, and moved into reserve in an attack from the area south of BUBLITZ toward RUMMELSBURG, did not succeed since the division was too weak and the terrain too difficult due to its vegetation. After minor initial success, the division was gradually forced back by superior enemy forces. It remained tied down, nevertheless, in my east flank and being the only reserve unit, it was later unavailable in the defense against the enemy's main attack

which was launched east of STARGARD about 1 March.

At that point, after a terrific artillery concentration, a sizeable enemy tank force penetrated the front of the 5th Jaeger Division on a line 4 kilometers wide and 6 kilometers deep. However, the courageous division, deployed in depth, was able to block the drive for the time being with its own strength without breaking contact to the right or left. But, already during the next day enemy tanks attacked in so great strength, that the sector of the 5th Jaeger Division between FALKENBURG and DRAMMBURG was penetrated, and the left flank of the III SS Panzer Corps and the right flank of the X SS Panzer Corps, joining the division sector, were rolled back. The front was thus cracked open. The enemy tanks had freedom of movement and pushed ahead. On the next day, spearheads already appeared at REGENSWALDE, eight kilometers east of my Army's command post which, however, continued to remain there. Strong infantry units followed and widened the gap. The enemy also gained ground daily in the direction of BAD POLZIN. NEUSTETTIN had been taken. Only on the west flank of the Army was it possible to repulse all enemy attacks against GREIFENHAGEN and PYRITZ, which was encircled on several occasions. In the north,

nevertheless, KOESLIN was lost after several days of fighting and tank spearheads pushed forward in the direction of KOLBERG. Tanks from the south also attempted to reach the city which had been designated a 'center of resistance'. Enemy pressure increased daily on the extended flanks of the Corps whose sector had been penetrated.

The Fuehrer, who until now had followed my report on a map suddenly looked up and interrupted me now in a hesitant but calm voice with the words: "We have been acquainted with the further course of the operation from the tactical reports submitted by you and the Army Group. Now tell us how the commanders and the troops behaved in battle".

Hitler as well as the invited listeners apparently were well aware that I was now about to touch upon the encirclement and annihilation of the X SS Panzer Corps and elements of the Corps Tettau and would give the reasons for these developments. (See report of my second discussion with Himmler).

Since this disaster can only be traced to his orders which were forwarded by Himmler and were contrary to all proposals made by my Army, he, by this inter-

ruption of the report prevented me from speaking freely on the subject and offer his own orders as evidence. This assumption is substantiated by the fact that the part of my report up to this point dealing with the tactical developments of the Pomeranian battle must have been just as familiar to him from the Army reports as that portion which would clearly show the dramatic effects of his personal orders.

After this unexpected change in my report, I described a number of small combat events which well illustrated the behavior of troops and commanders. They seemed the most appropriate as a reply to Hitler's question, "How the commanders and troops behaved in battle."

Examples of Valor

1. After the breakthrough on 22 February 1945 south of STEGERS, enemy tanks suddenly appeared at the outskirts of BALDENBURG. The antitank barriers on both ends of the town, which extended over a considerable distance were kept open for the normal thorough traffic. Suddenly the guard at the barrier at the southern exit of the town saw a Russian tank approaching at full speed. He quickly attempted to

place one of the heavy wooden horizontal bars into position. He did not succeed, however, and the leading enemy tank drove through, firing at the road block and pushed into the city. A second and a third T 34 followed closely behind and also attempted to pass through the barrier. However, at the last moment the alerted guards (three men) still managed to get the cross-bar in place in spite of tank fire. Nevertheless, the leading tank still tried to get into the town and consequently attempted to quickly ram the obstacles but in so doing was set on fire by a panzerfaust. A rifleman firing a second shot hit the next tank and put it out of action as well. In the meantime another soldier from the construction engineer unit also destroyed with a panzerfaust, the lead tank, which had advanced into the town. When the tank unit became aware of the fate of its lead tanks it stopped, widely scattered, in a small patch of woods close by and halted its advance for the day. As a result, a few 50-year old soldiers through their calm, courageous action were able to bring the initial penetration of 15 tanks to a halt and thus enabled the weak local holding force to defend, unaided, the village until the following day.

The successful Panzerfaust men had seen enemy

tanks for the first time in their lives, and had put them out of action. For their valor they were awarded the Iron Cross, Second Class.

2. The tank unit, referred to above, after having been substantially reinforced near BALDENBURG broke through the switch position. The very weak holding force of the Pomeranian Division maintained its position against all the attacks of the enemy's motorized units, and thus only the tanks were able to open a very narrow gap along the front which was closed a number of times by the defending force. As a result the momentum of the tank attack aiming at BUBLITZ, had been crippled. That was one of the main reasons for lack of aggressiveness displayed by the unit as it reached the gates of the city where it remained for two days. The other reason was the unit's insecure position in the woods where it was continually surprised by mobile tank destroyers. On one day alone it lost 16 tanks, and on the following day 12 more were knocked out by tank destroyers who went after them in the woods. In this manner, the tank assault against KOESLIN was delayed. Maps, showing future plans of the tank unit, were found in one of the wrecked tanks.

3. In order to widen the gap and protect the

south flank of the enemy tank unit, which had penetrated at BALDENBURG, an enemy infantry unit, supported by three T 34's turned off toward the southwest, took the village of BISCHOPTHUM and advanced toward KASIMIRSHOF. This town was held by a small detachment of approximately 20 construction engineers under the command of a line NCO who, having been badly wounded had temporarily been placed in charge of highway construction workers. Besides rifles, the detachment had only one machine gun and the N.C.O. was armed with two Panzerfausts. When he noticed the enemy approaching he deliberately and very calmly issued the order: "Everyone take cover in the fox-holes here on the outskirts of the village and permit the leading three tanks to roll by without firing on them. I will take care of these. Fire on the infantry following them, at a range of 500 meters and prevent their entrance into the village. I shall station myself behind this house on the main street of the village and wait for the tanks". A few minutes later one by one and carefully maintaining intervals, the tanks rolled into the village. The N.C.O. knocked out the last tank with one Panzerfaust whereupon the second tank turned toward the group of houses,

firing in movement toward the spot where he presumed resistance came from. But using bushes as cover, the NCO had already crept up close to the tank and from only a short distance had knocked out this tank as well, with the last Panzerfaust. When the lead tank saw the other two go up in flames, he pulled out of this sinister town by a side street and started on his way back. In so doing, he pulled the enemy infantry, pinned down by the defensive fire of the detachment, along with him. Immediately, the courageous NCO together with his men took up the pursuit and during the counterattack also recaptured the village which had been lost earlier. The NCO was again badly wounded during this action.

So much for the description by his battalion commander to whom I spoke personally at the main aid station in the presence of wounded participants of that action.

4. On 25 February airforce reported another unit of 22 tanks in a place 25 kilometers southeast of KOESLIN. A detachment of antitank fighters of about 60 men, which had immediately started out in that direction, stalked through the woods near the village. At night a strong reconnaissance patrol was dispatched to the village under cover of darkness and was to locate the

tanks. During their reconnaissance, the patrol noticed a light in a house and Russian officers were observed as they sat at their evening meal. The window was ripped open in one quick movement and at the same moment a hand grenade was thrown into the room. At this signal, the antitank fighters rushed into the village, firing rapidly as they came, and thus threw the surprised tank unit into utter turmoil. After brief fighting, a number of tanks were knocked out and set ablaze. In the ensuing confusion, the remaining tanks quickly evacuated the village, which remained in our possession two days longer. Shortly thereafter I was able to contact the courageous antitank fighters myself over the telephone from KOESLIN.

5. For three days the reconnaissance battalion of the 10th SS Panzer Division Frundsberg, having been moved up recently, had brought strong enemy tank columns to a stop with their assault guns at REGENSWALDE and PLATHE and thus rendered the westward evacuation of long columns of vehicles and carts from KOLBERG possible.

Subsequently in action at GREIFENBERG, the battalion prevented a turning maneuver and the further advance of enemy tank units aiming at Stettiner Haff, by offering stubborn resistance until it became completely encircled. Through the exertion of its last

ounce of strength, the battalion blasted its way out of the tank encirclement and broke through to its own lines.

6. During early March 1945 a tank unit suddenly appeared at one end of the Autobahn running from STETTIN to the east, with the obvious intention of advancing rapidly toward STETTIN on the best possible road. This was prevented by setting up a barrier at that point which was guarded by a weak covering force. The small detachment of valiant soldiers was surrounded and fired upon from all sides by enemy tanks. By using Panzerfausts and an antitank gun which was knocked out later, the detachment prevented the tanks from entering the Autobahn. In this effort the detachment dwindled down to only a few men. Finally after two or three hours of this unbalanced struggle, the enemy abandoned his plan when some of our own Tiger tanks approached. Six enemy tanks which had been set ablaze were the price the enemy had to pay in this effort. The Autobahn remained in our hands.

7. In order to prevent the establishment of a bridgehead east of ALTDAMM, tank units attempted to strike from the north via GOLLNOW into the rear of the III SS Panzer Corps which was engaged in bitter fight-

ing along both sides of the STARGARD - STETTIN highway and railroad line. This was prevented by a reinforced armored infantry regiment, located in the area of GOLLNOW, after fighting bitterly for the town and railway station. For more than a day the struggle surged back and forth. Numerous enemy tanks were destroyed, but our own forces also suffered heavy losses. Enemy tanks, initially focusing their efforts on the railroad station, drove into the area of our own artillery, which fought to the last round but was finally subdued. Two batteries were destroyed in the course of this heroic struggle. These sacrifices, however, saved the Corps from a much worse fate.

8. Encircled by the enemy, elements of the Corps Tettau were fighting in the rear of the enemy near REGENSWALDE and greatly harassed his operations. Recently, the Army reestablished radio contact with this force and ordered it to turn northward and attempt to reach the coast west of KOLBERG so that it might fight its way forward along the coast to the DIVENOW bridgehead. This unit reached the coast yesterday. Instructions as well as orders were transmitted to this force by means of a liaison plane [Fieseler Storch] which

had to detour far out over the sea. The unit should arrive in DIVENOW in a few days.²

9. Yesterday (7 March) an enemy unit with 34 tanks in attempt to reach the large bridge broke through DIVENOW bridgehead, which was being defended by young navy personnel. The navy troops, well-trained in the use of the Panzerfaust and under the command of Army's anti-tank officer, had neither antitank guns nor artillery, but were solely equipped with rifles and a few machine guns besides many new-type Panzerfausts. Armed with only these weapons they took up a fierce pursuit, and knocked out 33 of the 34 tanks which had broken through. One enemy tank, which had already reached the bridge across a tributary, was blown up together with the bridge.

10. And just before coming in, my chief of staff reported to me that an enemy tank attack was again carried out today against the same bridgehead held by the navy troops. The enemy, however, never reached our positions because the young navy troops greatly

² As a matter of fact Group Tettau arrived at the bridgehead on 12 March - consequently after the report to the Fuehrer. It brought with it about 20,000 soldiers of various units and approximately 30,000 refugees who with their vehicles and carts had attached themselves to this movement.

impaired by the previous day's victory, did not wait for the attack of the 36 advancing enemy tanks, echeloned in width and depth. On the contrary, the navy troops disposed along a broad front, jumped off and in disorganized fashion attacked the rapidly firing tank unit from all sides, and regardless of their own heavy losses forged ahead toward the tanks until they were within effective Panzerfaust range. In a short time all 36 tanks were knocked out. Their death-defying courage in relying on the Panzerfaust brought about a complete victory.

This unsurpassed heroism will someday go down in the annals of German history.

Conclusion

"My Fuehrer, the report should clearly indicate that the commanders of both large and small units, as well as the troops and the individual soldier, have done everything in their power to withstand the vastly superior enemy forces. They lacked neither ability, willingness, nor courage, but they did not possess superhuman strength. They all fought bravely and tenaciously even when the situation was hopeless, since no one wanted to be guilty for the loss of Ger-

man territory. In spite of being outnumbered from 6 to 20 times in manpower and equipment, the command and troops endured the utmost hardships in trying to avert a complete collapse of the front.

It can be explained only in this way, that in spite of all the existing needs, the front has been firmly reestablished in bridgeheads east of the ODER - even to the extent of being able to launch a successful counterattack at the southern wing where yesterday 86 enemy tanks were knocked out and ground suitable for further stabilization of a defensive front was gained.

As a peculiarity of the Pomeranian battle, I can report that of the 580 enemy tanks which have been knocked out up to this time, 380 or $2/3$ were destroyed by the Panzerfaust, that is, by the courage of the individual soldier. Never before has an Army achieved so much success with the Panzerfaust.

Therefore I can only express my complete appreciation to my commanders and all the troops of the Army for the great courage and self-denial shown in the unbalanced struggle for Pomerania.

Final observation

The Fuehrer and the others present were obviously impressed by my remarks but did not utter a word. I was dismissed by a trembling nod of Hitler's head.

My successor arrived the next day at my headquarters in STETTIN with a Fuehrer order and in accordance, I had to turn over command of the Army to him and was transferred to the officers' reserve pool. "That was the end of my 40-year tour of service".

A few days later, Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler was also relieved of his command as Commanding General Army Group Weichsel.


G L O S S A R Y

- ARMEEABTEILUNG - A reinforced corps, commanded by a Corps commander with a Corps Staff.
- ARMBEGRUPPE - A weak improvised army under an Army Commander with an improvised Army Staff.
- DIVISIONSGRUPPE- A unit formed by transferring the designation of a partially destroyed division to one of or a consolidation of its regiments.
- GAU - Nazi Party administrative area.
- GAULEITER - Official in charge of Nazi Party administrative area (Gau). His control over party matters in his area was complete, and gradually after 1933, and even more after 1939, he assumed complete control over the entire civilian population.
- JAEGER (division or other size unit) - light infantry
- KAMPFGRUPPE - A term loosely assigned to improvised combat units of various sizes, named usually after their commanders.
- KORPSABTEILUNG - A reinforced division commanded by a (usually senior) Division Commander, with a Division Staff.
- KORPSGRUPPE - Two or three understrength divisions assembled into a tactical unit under a Corps Commander, with an improvised Corps Staff.

- LUFTGAU - Administrative and supply organization of the German Air Force; its authority was limited to a well defined and permanently fixed geographical area. Those established in Germany were designated by Roman numerals, those in occupied areas by their location.
- ORGANIZATION
TODT - Paramilitary construction organization of the Nazi Party, auxiliary to the Wehrmacht. Named after its founder, Dr. Todt. Consisted of a cadre of engineers, expanded as necessary by the use of hired, conscript, or foreign labor.
- PANZERFAUST - Recoilless anti-tank grenade and launcher, both expendable.
- PANZERGRENADIER
(division or
other size
unit) - usually motorized, occasionally mechanized infantry.
- PANZERGRUPPE - Armored force the size of an army, but operating in conjunction with an army. (When operating independently, normally redesignated as a Panzer Army).
- REGIMENTGRUPPE - a. A regiment constituted during operations and consisting of men and equipment from various arms.
(or)
b. A reinforced battalion, given a regimental designation.
- REICHSWEHR - The German National Defense Establishment under the Versailles Treaty.
- HOLLBAHN - Road designated as a main axis of motorized transportation, from which all animal transport and marching columns were normally barred.

- VOLKSGRENADIER - A term first applied in autumn 1944, to reorganized infantry divisions, organized on reduced T/O with increased ratio of automatic weapons.
- VOLKSSTURM - Peoples' militia, assembled during the later years of the war, resembling somewhat the wartime State Guard in the U.S.
- WAFEN SS - Combat arm of the SS; in effect a partial duplication of the German Army.
- WEHRKREIS - The basic military area of Germany, resembling somewhat the pre-war U.S. Corps Area; had the additional functions of administering conscription and furnishing replacements to specific units (divisions and corps) whose home station was located in the Wehrkreis.

ESTIMATE OF ENEMY INTENTIONS 13 FEBRUARY 1945



2-3 ARMORED ARMIES
4 ARMIES

ESTIMATED:
40-50 DIV.
MORE THAN 1000 TANKS

SCALE APPR. 1:1500 000

Battle of Pomerania

(22 FEB - 10 MAR 1945)


FORCES:


OWN: KAMPFGRUPPE H. = 1 CORPS (2 DIV)
 III SS PZ CORPS = (3 SS PZ GR DIV)
 X SS PZ CORPS = (2 DIV)
 KAMPFGRUPPE TETTAU (2 DIV)
 4 CORPS = (9 DIV) + 70 TANKS


ENEMY: 8 ARMORED CORPS
 1 CAVALRY CORPS
 15 INF CORPS
 24 CORPS + 1600 TANKS


300 KM - FRONT
 120 KM - SWITCH POSITION

ONE DIVISION	TO A FRONTAGE OF	36 KM
" ARTY PIECE "	" " "	" 1 "
" TANK "	" " "	" 4 "
" AT GUN "	" " "	" 2,5 "
" BATTALION "	" " "	" 6 "









END OF FILE