THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE

FINAL REPORT

OF THE
SELECT COMMITTEE TO CONDUCT AN
INVESTIGATION AND STUDY OF THE FACTS,
EVIDENCE, AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE
KATYN FOREST MASSACRE.

Pursuant to
H. Res. 390

and

H. Res. 539

(82d Congress)

A RESOLUTION TO AUTHORIZE THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE MASS MURDER OF POLISH OFFICERS IN THE
KATYN FOREST NEAR SMOLENSK, RUSSIA

DECEMBER 22, 1952.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House
on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed

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SELECT COMMITTEE TO CONDUCT AN INVESTIGATION AND STUDY OF THE FACTS, EVIDENCE, AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The members of this committee join in expressing their deep appreciation to Mr. John J. Mitchell, chief counsel; Mr. Roman C. Pucinski, chief investigator; and Lucile S. Biebighauser, secretary. The vast amount of documentation and evidence compiled by this committee is a tribute to the diligence and effectiveness of their work in this unprecedented investigation.

The committee wishes to express their appreciation for the assistance and cooperation during the entire course of this investigation to the following people:

Mr. Ben Hill Brown, Jr., Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations.

Mr. Francis Shackelford, formerly counselor for the Department of the Army, now Assistant Secretary of the Army.

Mr. B. A. Monaghan, presently counselor for the Department of the Army.

Mr. Jerome P. Facher, a member of the Department of the Army counselors’ staff.

The members of the staff of the American Embassies at London and Paris, as well as the office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, contributed greatly to the success of the hearings this committee conducted in Europe during April 1952.

It would be impossible for this committee to express their gratitude personally to all individuals and organizations who have contributed materially to this investigation of the Katyn Forest massacre.

Note: Parts 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 of the hearings and the final report are on sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. An index of witnesses is listed on p. 38 of this report and an index of exhibits in each part on p. 44.
Mr. Madden, from the Select Committee To Conduct an Investigation and Study of the Facts, Evidence, and Circumstances of the Katyn Forest Massacre, submitted the following

FINAL REPORT

(Pursuant to H. Res. 300 and H. Res. 539, 82d Cong.)

INTRODUCTION

On September 18, 1951, the House of Representatives unanimously adopted House Resolution 300. This resolution provided for the establishment of a select committee to conduct a full and complete investigation concerning the Katyn massacre, an international crime committed against soldiers and citizens of Poland at the beginning of World War II.

The Katyn massacre involved some 4,243 of the 15,400 Polish Army officers and intellectual leaders who were captured by the Soviets when Russia invaded Poland in September 1939. These officers were interned in three Soviet prison camps in the territory of the U. S. S. R. They were permitted to correspond with their families in Poland until May 10, 1940. Then all trace of these men was lost after that date. Nothing further of their whereabouts was known until several mass graves containing remains of Polish bodies were discovered in the Katyn Forest near Smolensk, U. S. S. R., by the German troops in April of 1943.

The Katyn massacre was one of the most barbarous international crimes in world history. Since the discovery of the graves, and until this committee completed its investigation, the massacre remained an international mystery. The Soviets blamed the Germans for the crime. They charged the Poles fell into Nazi hands when Germany invaded Russia in the summer of 1941. The Germans organized a medical commission investigation consisting of leading doctors from 12 European nations including the neutral country of Switzerland. This medical commission met at Katyn on April 29 and 30,
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE

COMMITTEE APPOINTED

1943, and unanimously determined that the Poles were massacred in the spring of 1940. At that time the Katyn area was under the complete domination of the Soviets. Immediately following passage of House Resolution 390, the Speaker of the House of Representatives appointed the following members of this committee: Ray J. Madden, Democrat, Indiana, chairman; Daniel J. Flood, Democrat, Pennsylvania; Foster Furcolo, Democrat, Massachusetts; Thaddeus M. Machrowicz, Democrat, Michigan; George A. Dondero, Republican, Michigan; Alvin E. O'Konski, Republican, Wisconsin; and Timothy P. Sheshan, Republican, Illinois. The committee selected John J. Mitchell as chief counsel and Roman C. Pucinski as chief investigator.

PROCEDURE

The committee’s investigation was divided into two phases: First, to establish which nation actually was guilty of the massacre; and, second, to establish whether any American officials were responsible for suppressing the facts of the massacre with all of its ramifications from the American people.

INTERIM REPORT

On July 2, 1952, this committee filed with the House of Representatives an interim report (H. Rept. 2430) in which it fixed the guilt for the Katyn massacre on the Soviets (NKVD) Peoples’ Commissariat of Internal Affairs. On the basis of voluminous testimony, including that of recognized medical expert witnesses, and other data assembled by our staff, this committee concluded there does not exist a scintilla of proof, or even any remote circumstantial evidence, that this mass murder took place no later than the spring of 1940. The Poles were then prisoners of the Soviets and the Katyn Forest area was still under Soviet occupation. In the interim report this committee recommended the Soviets be tried before the International World Court of Justice for committing murder took place no later than the spring of 1940. At that time the Katyn area was under the complete domination of the Soviets.

The committee’s investigation was divided into two phases: First, to establish which nation actually was guilty of the massacre; and, second, to establish whether any American officials were responsible for suppressing the facts of the massacre with all of its ramifications from the American people.

The International Committee of the Red Cross, in April 1943, requested Soviet permission to conduct a neutral investigation at Katyn and their request was ignored by Moscow. In March 1951, the Inter-

national Committee of the Red Cross sent two delegates to Peiping, China, to request permission to conduct a neutral investigation of alleged war atrocities in Korea. In July 1951 Communist Red China refused permission to conduct such an investigation. Excerpts of our interim report appear in the appendix. This final report will deal primarily with the second phase of our investigation.

SECOND PHASE

The Congress requested that our committee determine why certain reports and files concerning the Katyn massacre disappeared or were suppressed by departments of our Government. Records and documents assembled from the State Department and War Department files provided a clear-cut picture of the tremendously important part the Katyn massacre played in shaping the future of postwar Europe.

From these hitherto secret documents this committee learned that as early as the summer of 1942 American authorities considered a Polish Army extremely vital to the Allied war effort against Hitler and Mussolini. Documents introduced in our hearings describe conclusively the efforts made to create such an army on Russian soil as quickly as possible. We learned further that American authorities knew as early as 1942 of Poland’s desperate efforts to locate her missing officers who could lead the Polish Army being formed on Russian soil.

These documents show that when high-level Polish officials first requested an adequate reply from the Soviets regarding the whereabouts of their missing officers, American emissaries intervened. In every instance, American officials were given the same reply: The Soviets had no knowledge of their whereabouts.

United States Ambassador to Moscow, Admiral William H. Standley, advised the State Department on September 10, 1943, that Soviet officials were opposed to United States intervention in Russo-Polish problems. This attitude was stated to Admiral Standley by Molotov when Standley inquired about the missing Polish officers.

Throughout 1942–43—or until the mass graves were discovered at Katyn—this committee’s record recites a long series of efforts being made by the United States to aid the Poles. But it also shows the total lack of cooperation the United States received from the Soviets.

When Russia finally broke diplomatic relations with Poland (April 98, 1943) following the Polish request for an International Red Cross investigation of the Katyn massacre, Ambassador Standley warned the State Department that Russia had been seeking a pretext to break with Poland for some time. He emphasized that the Soviets were planning to create a pro-Communist satellite Polish government which would take over Poland after the war. He warned that Russia was planning to create an entire belt of pro-Soviet governments in eastern Europe, which would jeopardize the peace of Europe.

It is apparent that American authorities knew of the growing tension between the Soviets and the Poles during 1942–43—and they likewise knew about the hopeless search for the Polish officers—but at the time, all of these factors were brushed aside, on the theory that pursuing the search would irritate Soviet Russia and thus hinder the prosecution of the war to a successful conclusion.
Harriman insisted that agreements made at Tehran and Yalta have assured a lasting peace if only the Soviets had kept their promises.

The Katyn massacre was announced to the world for the first time. Standley's warning about the Soviets which he made in 1943, when he was not given the details of Mr. Willkie's mission.

This committee believes the tragic concessions at Yalta might not have taken place if the Polish officer corps had not been annihilated by the Soviets at Katyn. With proper leadership, the Polish Army could have relieved a great deal of the early reverses suffered by the Allies. The Kremlin's hand would not have been as strong at the Yalta Conference, and many of the concessions made because of "military necessity", as maintained by Mr. Harriman, would have been obviated.

The Katyn investigation revealed that many individuals throughout the State Department, Army Intelligence (G-2), Office of War Information and Federal Communications Commission, and other Government agencies, failed to properly evaluate the material being received from our sources overseas. In many instances, this information was deliberately withheld from public attention and knowledge. This is a definite lack of coordination on intelligence matters between Army Intelligence (G-2) and the State Department, at least as far as the missing Polish officers and the Katyn massacre were concerned.

The possibility exists that many second-echelon personnel, who were overly sympathetic to the Russian cause or pro-Communist-minded, attempted to cover up derogatory reports which were received concerning the Soviets.

Former American Ambassador Averell Harriman—now Mutual Security Director—and former Under Secretary of State, Sumner Welles, explained why the United States acquiesced so frequently to outrageous Soviet demands.

Both said the underlying consideration throughout the war was military necessity. They agreed that American foreign policy called for a free postwar Poland to assure stability in Europe. Both concurred in the fact that the United States wanted a Polish Army very urgently in the Near East campaign. They insisted, however, that these considerations had to give way to military necessity and to the maintenance of our alliance with Russia. These witnesses further maintained the Allies feared Russia might make a separate peace with the Germans.

American emissaries who reported the status of conditions concerning the Soviets were either bypassed or disregarded if their views were critical of the Soviets. When some of the emissaries expressed anti-Soviet observations, President Roosevelt sent his personal representa­tives to confer directly with Marshal Stalin.

This was borne out by testimony of Ambassador Standley, who said that when he warned against Russia's postwar plans for forming a pro-Soviet bloc of nations around the U. S. S. R., President Roosevelt sent Wendell Willkie to confer with Stalin. Mr. Standley said he was not given the details of Mr. Willkie's mission.

In retrospect, we now realize the prophetic truth of Admiral Standley's warning about the Soviets which he made in 1943, when the Katyn massacre was announced to the world for the first time. (See vol. VII of the published hearings.)

Both Mr. Harriman and Mr. Welles, in testifying before our committee, conceded in effect that the United States officials had taken a gamble on Russia's pledge to work harmoniously with the western democracies after the war—and lost.

However, they presented arguments to justify their actions. Mr. Harriman insisted that agreements made at Tehran and Yalta would have assured a lasting peace if only the Soviets had kept their promises.

Mr. Harriman insisted that territorial concessions made to the Soviets at the Big Three conferences were predicated on the military reality that the Soviets were actually in physical control of these lands. To have resisted their demands, or to have tried to drive the Soviets out by force, would have meant prolonging the war, Mr. Harriman maintained.

He further testified that concessions made to the Soviets at Yalta were made at a time when the American Joint Chiefs of Staff insisted on getting the Soviets into the Japanese war at all costs.

Mr. Harriman said he personally "was full of distrust of the Soviets at the time." He declared the Yalta agreements were breached by the Soviets. He stated that the present government in Poland is not representative of its people. He added, "It is a puppet government of the Soviet Union."

Mr. Harriman testified:

The war has become more and more united. (See vol. VII of the published hearings.)

This committee believes the tragic concessions at Yalta might not have taken place if the Polish officer corps had not been annihilated by the Soviets at Katyn. With proper leadership, the Polish Army could have relieved a great deal of the early reverses suffered by the Allies. The Kremlin's hand would not have been as strong at the Yalta Conference, and many of the concessions made because of "military necessity", as maintained by Mr. Harriman, would have been obviated.

The absence of these officers is the principal reason for the shortage of officers in the Polish forces in Russia, wither officers from Scotland had to be sent lately. The possible death of these men, most of whom have superior education, would be a severe blow to the Polish national life.

President Roosevelt intercedes

This committee heard testimony and studied documents which clearly show President Roosevelt himself appeared concerned about Polish-Soviet relations. When Marshal Stalin informed the President of his decision to break off diplomatic relations with the Poles following their demand for an International Red Cross investigation of Katyn, Mr. Roosevelt sent a personal message urging Stalin to reconsider his action.

The tone of Mr. Roosevelt's message clearly demonstrated his desire to maintain cordial relations with the Soviets. (See exhibit 17, pt. VII of the published hearings.)

When again, in 1944, former Ambassador George Howard Earle, who served as a special emissary for President Roosevelt in the Balkans, testified to convince Mr. Roosevelt that the Soviets were guilty of the Katyn massacre, the President dismissed the suggestion.

Testifying before this committee that he based his statement to the President on secret documents and photographs of Katyn clearly establishing Soviet guilt, Mr. Earle quoted the President as replying:

George, this is entirely German propaganda and a German plot. I am absolutely convinced the Russians did not do this.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE

It becomes apparent to this committee that the President and the State Department ignored numerous charges from Ambassador Standley, Ambassador Bidle, and Ambassador Winant, American emissaries to London, who reported information which strongly pointed to Soviet perfidy.

It becomes obvious Mr. Roosevelt's dealings with the Soviets throughout the war were based on a strong desire for mutual cooperation with Russia in the war effort. This desire was based on a belief in Soviet Russia's sincerity. It is equally obvious that this desire completely overshadowed the dictates of justice and equity to our loyal but weaker ally, Poland.

CONCLUSIONS ON THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

When Sumner Welles was asked by a member of this committee if a more firm attitude toward the Soviets during the war would have helped avoid some of today's postwar problems, Mr. Welles replied:

It is a very difficult thing to answer in the light of hindsight. As I look at it today, I think you are entirely correct. As we looked at it then, of course, the success of the war effort was the major effort; and I must remind the committee that the one overshadowing fear on the part of our military authorities at that time was a separate peace on the part of the Soviet Government with Germany.

It appears from the record that the Katyn massacre undermined Polish-Soviet relations throughout the war and thereafter. Katyn was a means to an end. The Soviets had plotted to take over Poland as early as 1939. Their massacre of these Polish officers was designed to eliminate the intellectual leadership which subsequently would have attempted to block Russia's ultimate designs for complete communization of Poland. This was but a step of the Soviets toward the complete communization of Europe and eventually the entire world, including the United States.

The record of this committee shows that the United States had been forewarned of Soviet Russia's treacherous designs on Poland and the rest of Europe. Whatever the justification may be, this committee is convinced the United States in its relations with the Soviets found itself in the tragic position of winning the war but losing the peace.

THE VAN VLIET REPORT

On May 22, 1945, an American Infantry officer, Col. John H. Van Vliet, Jr., arrived in Washington from Europe and promptly reported to Maj. Gen. Clayton Bissell, Army Assistant Chief of Staff in charge of Army Intelligence (G-2), to record his observations at Katyn. Colonel Van Vliet and Captain Donald Stewart, while German prisoners of war, had been taken to the mass burial grounds by the Nazis in May 1943. It was apparent the Nazis had hoped to bolster credence in their charges by taking Colonel Van Vliet and Captain Stewart, as well as British officers, to the scene of the graves. Neither Colonel Van Vliet nor Capt. Donald Stewart would commit themselves to any conclusion while in Nazi detention. But as soon as Colonel Van Vliet was liberated he came to the Pentagon to make his report.

On General Bissell's orders, Colonel Van Vliet described his observations and concluded, emphatically and unequivocally, that he was convinced the Polish officers were murdered by the Soviets.

General Bissell promptly labeled the report "Top secret." This report was made on a single original manuscript, without copies. General Bissell ordered Colonel Van Vliet to maintain absolute secrecy concerning his report.

This "Top secret" document has disappeared from the Army Intelligence (G-2) files, and to this date has not been found. The search for the Van Vliet report has been one of the most important "tasks of this committee. An independent investigation conducted by the Army's Inspector General in 1959 concluded the report had been "compromised" and that there is nothing to indicate it had ever left Army Intelligence (G-2). This finding was in response to General Bissell's allegation that he "believes" he had forwarded Van Vliet's report to the Department of State.

Appearing before this committee on two different occasions, General Bissell steadfastly maintained his belief that he had forwarded the document to the Department of State on May 25, 1945.

GENERAL BISSELL TESTIFIES

General Bissell introduced into evidence a letter he had written to Assistant Secretary of State Julius Holmes on that date, inquiring if the State Department had any record of another Van Vliet document, and interrogation by a Swiss Protecting Power official shortly after Colonel Van Vliet had visited Katyn. Bissell's letter of May 25 bears no notation that an enclosure was attached. Nor is there any record of a receipt for the "Top secret" report to prove the document actually was received by the Department of State. (See exhibit 5, pt. VII of the published hearings.)

General Bissell introduced evidence another letter he had written August 21, 1945, to Mr. Frederick B. Lyon, Mr. Holmes' assistant in the Department of State. In this letter General Bissell includes a report by a British officer who likewise was taken to Katyn by the Nazis. General Bissell concludes his letter of August 21 with the statement:

This report substantiates in effect the statement of Col. John H. Van Vliet, Jr., forwarded to General Holmes on the 25th day of May 1945.

In his testimony before this committee General Bissell contended that the particular phrase in his letter of August 21 substantiates his claim that he sent the Van Vliet report to the State Department. Both Mr. Holmes, who is now Minister of the American Embassy in London, and Mr. Lyon testified before the committee. Under oath, they disavowed any knowledge of ever having received the Van Vliet report from General Bissell. They also stated that if they had discussed this report with General Bissell they would have remembered it because of the "political significance" involved at that time.

It is this committee's conclusion that General Bissell is mistaken in his claim that he might have forwarded the Van Vliet report to the State Department. The committee believes the Van Vliet report was either removed or purposely destroyed in Army Intelligence (G-2).

General Bissell himself admitted to the committee that had the Van Vliet report been published in 1945, when agreements for creating a United Nations organization reached at Yalta were being carried
out in San Francisco, Soviet Russia might never have taken a seat
in this international organization.

In justifying his actions for designating the Van Vliet report “Top
secret,” General Bissell said he was merely carrying out the spirit of
the Xalta agreement.

He admitted the report was explosive and came at a time when the
United States was still trying to get a commitment from the Soviets
to enter the Japanese war. General Bissell contradicted his own
testimony when he told the committee that the Van Vliet
Szymanski, was sent to join that army
out his mission in Russia because the

8

THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE

he admitted frequent conferences with the State Department and other
Government agencies. However, testifying before this committee,
when faced with his own broadcast of May 3, 1943, in which he ac­
cused the Nazis of using the Katyn massacre as propaganda, he ad­
mitted under questioning that this broadcast was made on his
own initiative.

This is another example of the failure to coordinate between Gov­
ernment agencies. A State Department memorandum dated April
22, 1943, which was read into the record (see vol. VII of the
published hearings), stated:

and on the basis of the various conflicting contents [concerning Katyn]
of all parties concerned, it would appear to be advisable to refrain from taking
any definite stand in regard to this question.

Mr. Davis, therefore, bears the responsibility for accepting the
Soviet propaganda version of the Katyn massacre without full in­
vestigation. A very simple check with either Army Intelligence
and the State Department would have revealed that the Katyn
massacre issue was extremely controversial.

Furthermore, members of the staff of both OWI and FCC did en­
gage in activities beyond the scope of their responsibilities. This
unsual activity of silencing radio commentators first came to light
in August 1945 when the House committee investigating the National
Communications Commission discovered the procedure.

The technique utilized by staff members of OWI and FCC to si­
ence was as follows: Polish radio commentators in Detroit and Buf­
falo broadcasting in foreign languages after the announcement
of the mass graves of Polish officers at Katyn reported facts
indicating that the Soviets might be guilty of this massacre.

In May 1945 a member of the FCC staff suggested to a member of
the OWI staff that the only way to prevent these comments was to
contact the Wartime Foreign Language Radio Control Committee.
This committee was made up of station owners and managers who
were endeavoring to cooperate with the OWI and FCC during the
war years. Accordingly a meeting was arranged in New York with
two of the members of this industry committee. They were specifi­
cally requested by the OWI FCC staff member to arrange to have a Polish
radio commentator in Detroit restrict his comments to straight news
items concerning Katyn, and only those by the standard wire services.
The fact that a member of the FCC staff attended this meeting is sig­
nificant because the FCC in such a case had no jurisdiction. In fact,
the FCC member was in New York to discuss the renewal of the radio
license of one of these industry members. The owner of the radio
station Detroit was contacted and requested to restrict the com­
ments of the Polish commentator on his station, and this was done.

By applying indirect pressure on the station owner, these staff mem­
bers accomplished their purpose, namely, keeping the full facts of
the Katyn massacre story from the American people. (See vol. VII of the
published hearings.)

Office of Censorship officials testified and supported the conclusion
of this committee that the OWI and FCC officials acted beyond the
scope of their official Government responsibilities on this matter of
Katyn.
Testimony before this committee likewise proves that the Voice of America—successor to the Office of War Information—had failed to fully utilize available information concerning the Katyn massacre until late in 1945. The committee was impressed with statements that publication of facts concerning this crime, prior to 1951, would lead to an ill-fated uprising in Poland. Neither was it convinced by the statements of OWI officials that for the Polish-Americans to hear or read about the Katyn massacre in 1945 would have resulted in a lessening of their cooperation in the Allied war effort.

**M.R. JUSTICE JACKSON**

Mr. Justice Jackson appeared before this committee and advised that he had received no instructions or information concerning the Katyn massacre. When asked to explain how the Katyn affair happened to come on the agenda of the Nuremberg trials under the indictment of Herman Goering, he stated that the Soviets were responsible for drawing indictments on war crimes committed in eastern Europe. Mr. Justice Jackson stated as follows:

To the United States was allocated the over-all conspiracy to incite and wage a war of aggression. The British were assigned the violation of specific treaties and crimes on the high seas. Violations of the laws of war and crimes against humanity were divided on a geographical basis. The French undertook crimes in western Europe, and the Soviet prosecution was assigned the duty of preparing and presenting evidence of crimes in eastern Europe—an area largely in Soviet occupation, and to much of which the others of us had no access. The geographical area thus assigned to the Soviet representatives included Katyn wood and Poland as well, but at that time it was not known that the Katyn massacre would be involved.

When asked by the committee if he had received the various reports then in the files of the State Department and Army Intelligence (G-2), Mr. Justice Jackson testified that he had not. When asked by the committee what he would have done if he had received these reports, he replied as follows:

Of course, any information would have been helpful. If we had had information of that kind, I cannot pass on whether this would have been adequate, but if we had had adequate information of Russian guilt, we would not have consented at all to have the charge against the Nazis. It would have strengthened our hand in keeping it out immensely and probably would have resulted in the Soviets not making the accusation.

Before this committee was formed, many allegations were made that Americans on Mr. Jackson's staff at Nuremberg assisted the Soviets in the preparation of this case on Katyn against the Nazis. The committee desired to clarify this point and specifically asked Mr. Jackson this question, and he denied that any member of his staff participated in the preparation of the Katyn indictment. The committee viewed with interest Mr. Justice Jackson's statement in his testimony which is as follows:

_But, of course, any information would have been helpful. If we had had information of that kind, I cannot pass on whether this would have been adequate, but if we had had adequate information of Russian guilt, we would not have consented at all to have the charge against the Nazis. It would have strengthened our hand in keeping it out immensely and probably would have resulted in the Soviets not making the accusation._

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**CONCLUSIONS**

1. In submitting this final report to the House of Representatives, this committee has come to the conclusion that in those fateful days
The final report of the Select Committee Investigating the Katyn Forest Massacre hereby incorporates the recommendations contained in the interim report, filed on July 2, 1952 (H. Rept. No. 2430).

This committee unanimously recommends that the House of Representatives approve the committee’s findings and adopt a resolution:

1. Requesting the President of the United States to forward the testimony, evidence, and findings of this committee to the United States delegates at the United Nations;

2. Requesting further that the President of the United States issue instructions to the United States delegates to present the Katyn case to the General Assembly of the United Nations;

3. Requesting that appropriate steps be taken by the General Assembly to seek action before the International World Court of Justice against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for committing a crime at Katyn which was in violation of the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;

4. Requesting the President of the United States to instruct the United States delegation to seek the establishment of an international commission which would investigate other mass murders and crimes against humanity.

RAY J. MADDEN, Chairman.
DANIEL J. FLOOD,
THADEUS M. MACHNOWICZ,
GEORGE A. DONDERO,
ALVINE O'KONOWSKI,
TIMOTHY P. SHEEHAN.

SUPPLEMENTARY STATEMENT BY MR. SHEEHAN

On November 22d I addressed a letter to the Honorable Ray J. Madden, chairman of our committee, listing my conclusions for the consideration of the Katyn Committee to be incorporated in the final report.

Most of these conclusions have been incorporated in the final report and I am happy to join with my colleagues in making this a unanimous report. However, it seems to me that there is need for further emphasis on several points covered in the report and I feel these points can be best emphasized by this addendum to the final report.

MISJUDGMENT OF RUSSIA

On page 3 of this final report the opening sentence under the heading “Second phase” read:

“The Congress requested that our committee determine why certain reports and files concerning the Katyn massacre disappeared or were suppressed by departments of our Government.

From the disclosure of many hitherto secret documents and from the oral testimony of men like our former Ambassadors Standley and Harriman, Special Ambassador George Earle, the former Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles and others, the cover-up of the facts of the Katyn massacre and withholding them from the American people was but a part of the desire on the part of the Democratic administration to cover their basic and colossal error in their foreign policy judgment.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt, who Mr. Harriman stated set our foreign policy and was the final authority on all foreign policy decisions, thought that Russia would disintegrate immediately after the end of the war. When warned by various of his appointees that Russia would become a great menace, Mr. Roosevelt silenced these men and refused to heed their advice. Mr. Roosevelt kept committing our country to agreements with the Russians in spite of the fact, as Mr. Harriman stated, that—

‘* * * There were a series of misdeeds by the Russians, from our standpoint, beginning with the Ribbentrop treaty, that it (revelation of the Katyn massacre) would have contributed, I think, to further distrust of the Soviets.

Roosevelt’s misjudgment that Russia would honor her agreements, in spite of the factual record of her past broken promises, has proven to be the major error in our entire foreign policy. In setting this policy, our Government, through the State Department, the Army Intelligence G-2, the Office of War Information, and the Voice of America, followed the policy line so that the American people were
misled. During the war the American public was led to believe that Russia was a loyal and trustworthy ally and after the war and until very recently, the executive department covered up the fact that they were so grossly mistaken about Russia.

To me, the reason why our Government suppressed the truth about the Katyn massacre was because this was but a small part of the giant error made in our foreign-policy program. If our Government would have disclosed the truth about Katyn and the sell-out of Poland, it would have had to disclose more truths about the perfidy of Russia. The American people would have spoken in no uncertain terms and the Democrat administration did not want that to happen for very obvious reasons.

PROPAGANDA AGENCIES

Admittedly, during the Katyn investigation, we but scratched the surface on the part that the Office of War Information and the Voice of America took in following the administration line in suppressing the facts about the Katyn massacre. During the war there may have been a reasonable excuse for not broadcasting facts which were available in our State Department and Army Intelligence about the Katyn massacre and other facts which proved Russia's failure to live up to her agreements. After the war there certainly was no excuse for not using in our propaganda war the truths which were in the files of our various Government departments.

One of the witnesses from the Department of State, which controls the policy of the Voice of America, stated that they did not broadcast the fact of Katyn behind the iron curtain because they did not have sufficient facts on it. Yet the preponderance of evidence presented to our committee about the cover-up came from the files of the State Department itself.

The Voice of America, in its limited broadcasts about the Katyn massacre, followed a wishy-washy, spineless policy. From other information revealed about the policies followed by the Voice of America, a committee of the Congress ought to make a thorough investigation and see to it that the Voice pursues a firm and workable propaganda program and does not serve to cover up the mistakes of the State Department or the incumbent administration.

ARMY INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES

The United States Congress should investigate the wartime and postwar operation of the Army Intelligence (G-2) and the Counter-Intelligence Agency.

In our search for the missing Van Vliet report in the Army Intelligence Agency, there was revealed a very serious lack of close liaison between the various Government agencies.

There was revealed to the committee a definite pro-Soviet sympathy by certain people working for G-2 during the war. In early 1942 one of our military attaches connected with Intelligence recommended that counterintelligence measures be set up against the Russians; he was advised that he showed a Russian bias and did not know what he was doing. Several men who were openly anti-Russian were soon transferred out of this department. Documents were missing from this department which tended to be contrary to Russian interests. It was pointed out to our committee in executive session that quite a number of employees in G-2 who were suspected of Communist or left-wing sympathies were transferred to the Counter-Intelligence Agency.

Just several months ago two German officials of an agency which is the equivalent of our Federal Bureau of Investigation refused to make use of our Counter-Intelligence Agency because they stated the German division of this agency was infiltrated by the Communists.

Mr. Harriman in his testimony stated that on the "strong recommendation of our Chiefs of Staff" every effort was made to get Russia to come into the war against Japan. The quick and complete collapse of Japan took everyone by surprise because we thought the American armies would be forced to land on the plains of Tokyo. Postwar revelations proved that Japan sought out Russian help about 6 months prior to the end of the war, pleading with Russia to act as a peace intermediary. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were undoubtedly following the advice of Army Intelligence agencies, which apparently were grossly mistaken.

Did Russian influence in our Army Intelligence contribute to this gross miscalculation of Japan's fighting capabilities? If so, is this element still in Army Intelligence? For the peace and security of our country, some independent body such as Congress should investigate.

Mr. Alvin E. O'Konski concurs in the above statement of Mr. Sheehan.
SUPPLEMENTARY STATEMENT OF MESSRS. MADDEN, FLOOD, AND MACHROWICZ

We have carefully examined the statement submitted by Mr. Sheehan. We believe that the final report adopted unanimously and signed by all the members of the committee adequately and fully explains all the matters contained in this addendum. We are therefore submitting no additional remarks.

APPENDIX

EXCERPTS FROM INTERIM REPORT, JULY 2, 1952

I. INTRODUCTION

Hearings

The committee's first public hearing was held in Washington on October 11, 1951. It heard the testimony of Lt. Col. Donald B. Stewart, a United States Army officer, who as a German prisoner of war, was taken by the Germans to view the mass graves at Katyn in May 1943. (See pt. I of the committee's published hearings.)

The next set of hearings was held in Washington on February 4, 5, 6, and 7, 1952. Seven witnesses appeared and rendered an account of their knowledge relating to the Katyn massacre. (See pt. II of the published hearings.)

In Chicago on March 13, 14, 1952, eight other witnesses were heard by this committee. (See pt. III of the published hearings.)

In London on April 16, 17, 18, and 19, 1952, 20 witnesses were heard. (See pt. IV of the published hearings.)

In Frankfurt, Germany, on April 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, and 26, 1952, 27 witnesses were heard. (See pt. V of the published hearings.)

In Berlin, Germany, on April 25, a subcommittee heard testimony from members of the German Commission on Human Rights and received approximately 100 depositions which had been taken by that organization.

In Naples, Italy, on April 27, testimony of Dr. Palmieri was heard.

In Washington on June 3 and 4, 1952, testimony was heard from five witnesses.

In the course of the hearings held by this committee to date, testimony has been taken from a total of 81 witnesses; 182 exhibits have been studied and made part of the record, and more than 100 depositions were taken from witnesses who could not appear at the hearings. In addition, the committee staff has questioned more than 200 other individuals who offered to appear as witnesses but whose information was mostly of a corroborating nature.

LETTERS OF INVITATION

The committee unanimously agreed that in order to make this a full, fair, and impartial investigation, it would be willing to hear any individual, organization, or government having possession of factual evidence or information pertaining to the Katyn massacre.

Letters of invitation were forwarded to the Government of the U. S. S. R., the Polish Government in Warsaw, the Polish Government-in-Exile in London, and the German Federal Republic. The German Federal Republic and the Polish Government-in-Exile accepted the invitation.

The Soviet Government rejected the invitation of the committee with the statement that a Special Soviet Commission (composed of all Russian citizens) had thoroughly investigated the Katyn massacre in January 1944 and consequently there was no need for reopening the issue. However, the Soviet Government did attach to their reply the special commission's report and it later was made part of the permanent record of this committee. (See pp. 223 through 247, pt. III of the published hearings.)

The Polish Government in Warsaw transmitted to the American Embassy a note likewise rejecting the committee's invitation, part of which is quoted as follows:

"The attitude of the Polish Government re the activities of this committee was expressed in the declaration of the Polish Government published on March 1, 1952, and the Polish Government does not intend to return to this matter again."

The entire note may be found on page 504 of part IV of the public hearings of this committee.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE

The attitude of the Polish Government as quoted above was revealed by the very propaganda blast issued in the form of a press release and circulated to all newspaper correspondents by the Polish Embassy in Washington. The chairman of the committee published this press release in its entirety in the London Record on March 13, 1952, and called upon the Secretary of State to take prompt action relative to the propaganda activities of the Polish Embassy here in Washington. The Secretary of State on March 29, 1952, delivered a stern reprimand to the Polish Embassy regarding such press releases and greatly restricted its activities in this field.

HOUSE RESOLUTION 539

The first two series of hearings definitely established in the minds of this committee that it would be impossible to conduct a thorough investigation without obtaining the testimony of available witnesses in Europe. Consequently, the committee went before the House of Representatives on March 11, 1952, with House Resolution 539 which amended the original, House Resolution 500, and requested permission to take testimony from individuals and governments abroad. The House approved House Resolution 539 on March 11, 1952.

FININGS

This committee unanimously agrees that evidence dealing with the first phase of its investigation proves conclusively and irrevocably the Soviet NKVD (People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs) committed the massacre of Polish Army officers in the Katyn Forest near Smolensk, Russia, not later than the spring of 1940.

This committee further concludes that the Soviets had plotted this criminal extermination of Poland's intellectual leadership as early as the fall of 1939—shortly after Russia's treacherous violation of the Polish nation's borders. There can be no doubt this massacre was a calculated plot to eliminate all Polish leaders who subsequently would have opposed the Soviets' plans for communizing Poland.

In course of its investigation, this committee has observed a striking similarity between what happened to the Polish officers in Katyn and the events now taking place in Korea. We unanimously agree that this constitutes a most powerful argument in favor of the preamble to be inserted in its duty to the American people and the free people of the world if it failed to point out that the identical evasions by the Soviets to the Polish Government while the Poles were searching for their 15,000 missing officers in 1941, appear again in the delaying tactics now being used by the Communists in Korea.

This committee feels that Katyn may well have been a blueprint for Korea. Just as the Soviets failed for almost 2 years to account for the missing Polish officers, so to this day the Communists in Korea have failed to account for many thousands of captured United Nations soldiers. Among these are 8,000 Americans, from General Ridgway's description as atrocity victims in his report to the United Nations last July, and the estimated 60,000 South Koreans still unaccounted for.

The Communists' delaying tactics in the Korean peace talks today may be from the same blue print as the nebulous replies received from the Soviets by the Poles in 1941-42 while they searched for their missing officers.

II. STATEMENT OF HISTORICAL FACTS

On September 1, 1939, Germany declared war on Poland and consequently World War II began.

On September 13, 1939, the Polish Ambassador in Moscow was handed a note by the Soviet Government which stated that the Soviet Government was no longer willing to maintain the peace which had been signed at the Treaty of Versailles and was prepared to take military action in the event of any hostile moves by the Polish Government. The note was a clear threat to Poland, but the Polish Government was not prepared to yield to the Soviet demands.

On September 17, 1939, the Soviets crossed the Polish border and, under the guise of coming to the Poles' assistance, occupied the eastern part of Poland.

On September 28, 1939, the German-Soviet Boundary and Friendship Treaty (commonly known as the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact) was announced to the world. Under this treaty Poland was divided—with Germany taking 72,500 miles,

population 22 million; the U. S. S. R. taking 75,500 square miles, population 13 million.

From September 1939 through March 1940 a deliberate well-organized plan was executed by the NKVD to separate Polish Army officers and intellectual leaders from the mass of other Polish prisoners and the placing of those selected in three camps in Soviet Russia, namely, Kontelek, Starobialsk, and Ostashkov. On April 3, 1943, the Germans attacked the U. S. S. R. On July 30, 1941, the U. S. S. R. and Poland signed an agreement renewing diplomatic relations. Under this agreement, all Poles interned in Soviet prison camps within the territories of the U. S. S. R. were to be released by the Soviets. The same agreement provided for the formation of a Polish Army whose commander was to be appointed by the Polish Government-in-Exile in London.

On August 14, 1941, the Polish-U. S. S. R. military pact was signed.

On August 16, 1941, General Anders began his fruitless search for the missing Polish officers.

On April 13, 1943, the Germans announced the discovery of the mass graves at Katyn Forest in Russia containing bodies of Polish Army officers, intellectuals, Government officials, and clergy.

On April 15, 1943, the Polish Government-in-Exile in London appealed to the International Committee of the Red Cross to send a delegation to investigate on the spot the true state of affairs at the Katyn Forest, near Smolensk, Russia.

On April 25, 1943, V. M. Molotov, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the U. S. S. R., sent a note to Mr. T. R. Ramer, Polish Ambassador to the U. S. S. R. Ambassador Ramer refused to accept the note.

On April 26, 1943, the U. S. S. R. severed diplomatic relations with Poland because Poland had approached the International Committee of the Red Cross to conduct a neutral investigation.

On April 30, 1943, a medical commission of leading representatives of medical jurisprudence and criminology from 12 European universities and neutral countries, selected by the Germans, signed a protocol establishing these Polish officers were massacred in the spring of 1940.

On January 24, 1944, the Soviet Special Commission Investigate the Katyn Massacre published its own report stating that the Nazi Germans had committed the atrocity after the Poles fell captive to the Nazis in July-August 1941.

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said they received countless inquiries regarding the fate of their compatriots who were selected to the NKVD, as contrasted to the NKVD prisoner-of-war camps which were guarded by ordinary Russian soldiers.

(4) These were not ordinary prisoner-of-war camps, but installations heavily guarded by the select NKVD, as contrasted to ordinary Soviet prisoner-of-war camps which were guarded by ordinary Russian soldiers.

(5) These prisoners remained at the three camps from September-October 1939, until April-May 1940.

**INTERROGATION OF PRISONERS**

(6) This 6 months' internment was meant as a period of political investigation and observation. Each prisoner was examined exhaustively and in each instance several times—mostly during 24 hours and interrogated for several hours.

(a) The NKVD placed great emphasis on the social origin, political views, party adherence, professional qualifications and in particular—if the prisoner had participated in Poland's successful defeat of the Bolsheviks in 1920.

(b) During the long and exhausting interrogations, discussions were held on the subject of war, its reasons and probable outcome, the attitude of the prisoner toward Russia and particularly his knowledge of the Soviet Union.

(c) It is obvious to the committee from this line of questioning and from the conclusions of the witnesses that the Soviets were trying to determine if any of these prisoners eventually could be converted to communism. Evidence clearly established that from this entire group of Poles interned at the three camps, only six subsequently joined Soviet forces.

(7) About March 1940, the interrogations were completed and it was announced almost simultaneously in Kozielsk, Ostashkov, and Starobelsk the camps would shortly be liquidated. Rumors began to circulate in the camp that the prisoners would be sent home. According to testimony presented to this committee by witnesses both in America and Europe, the camp authorities, when speaking to the prisoners, encouraged these rumors.

During evacuation of the 3 camps, groups of 200 to 300 Poles left each day, sometimes every second day and sometimes every third day.

(9) The evacuation continued in the three camps until the middle of May 1940. From among this entire group of 15,400 Poles interned in the 3 camps only 400 survived. These were taken to another NKVD camp at Pavilishev-Bor where they were finally questioned in hopes of converting them to communism.

(a) Apart from this small group of 400 Poles who survived (listed in exhibit 2, part IV of the published hearings), the world has never heard from a single other Polish officer who was interned in these camps between the period September-October 1939, and April-May 1940.

(b) The Polish Government-in-exile and relatives who subsequently fled from Germany to Poland have tirelessly searched for these missing men for 12 years. In not a single instance have any of these prisoners been heard from or seen since their evacuation from these camps.

(c) In October of 1940, when the Soviets began to fear an assault by the Nazis, certain members of this group of 400 survivors were asked to form a staff for a proposed Polish Army in Russia. It appeared this group did not have enough qualified men for such a staff. One witness testified in London that he asked the Soviet Minister of State Security Mirkulow in October of 1940, why the Soviet s didn't enlist the officers from these camps in the proposed Polish Army. Mirkulow replied: "We have committed an error. These men are not available. We will give you others." This statement was made by Mirkulow 6 months after the Russians evacuated the three camps. (See page 555, vol. IV of the published hearings.)

**1940**

(a) Zygmunt Luszczynski, of London, testified that after he was evacuated from the Kozielsk camp he was returned to Russia on April 24, 1940, his train composed of seven cars, stopped at Wiasma. He stated:

"I am sure there are three Katyns in the world. One Katyn is in the Katyn Forest. One Katyn is in Grzelowo (Simoľsk). The second Katyn, of Starobelsk, would be near Kharkov, and the prisoners of Ostashkov, near the White Sea."
The Katyn Forest Massacre

Routes Taken by Polish Prisoners of War Evacuated From the Three Camps: Kozelsk, Ostashkov, and Stareboleslav During the Spring of 1940 While the Territory Still Was in Soviet Hands

Legend
The route of the murdered Polish officers subsequently found buried in the mass graves at Katyn.
Probable route of the missing but not found at Katyn.
Route of the 400 Polish officers who survived.
Route of these 400 survivors when they eventually were released by the Soviet and permitted to join the Polish Army in Russia in 1941.

Map of the Katyn Forest region with routes and locations marked.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE

To the best of my knowledge, based on considerable research on the subject, the prisoners in Ostashkov were placed on two very old barges, and when the barges were towed out to sea they were destroyed by Russian artillery fire. Capt. George Groebich, who had been interned in Katieisk, recalled that:

"Everybody was dressed when leaving the camp just as he was when taken prisoner. Most of the people were in overcoats when they left the camp."

This testimony corroborates to a great extent the testimony of numerous witnesses who had actually been taken to the scene of the graces and who had observed that most of the bodies of the massacred Polish officers were in overcoats, either wearing overcoats or winter underwear.

The committee considers itself doubtful the victims would be wearing winter garb in August. (\textit{em})

15 Even more startling was Groebich's testimony that when he read the list of Poles being removed from the graves in Katyn published by the Germans shortly after the discovery of the graves in 1943, he noted that these bodies were being exhumed in the same group formations as they were when evacuated from Kieieisk. It is difficult to accept the theory that these men who allegedly left Katieisk in April of 1940, to be assigned to special work units west of Smolensk by the Russians, should remain in the identical groupings until 1941 when they were allegedly murdered by the Germans. (\textit{em})

(15) This committee has tried to explain how the 400 who survived from the three camps were selected. General Wolkowick, testifying in London, said he believed he was spared because prior to Poland's rebirth, following World War I, he was a Russian Naval officer who won distinction in the Russo-Japanese War.

"I was the only officer who opposed the surrender of (this Russian) ship, and that is why their attitude toward me was one of considerable interest. (See p. 645, pt. IV.)"

(A) General Wolkowick showed this committee an immunization card given to him by the Russians while he was interned at Katieisk. He testified hundreds of similar cards subsequently were found on the bodies of Poles exhumed in Katyn. (See exhibit 37, pt. IV.)

The committee considers itself fortunate in getting the testimony of the above-mentioned witnesses who constitute only a small group of the 400 survivors taken to Grunau by the Soviets in June 1940, who remained there until they were released on July 30, 1941, to the Polish Army. Their testimony has been instrumental toward helping this committee arrive at a conclusion.

IV. SEARCH FOR THE MISSING POLISH OFFICERS

Having established that approximately 15,400 Polish officers and leaders had been imprisoned in these three major camps and that after June 1940 only 400 were known to be alive, the next major trend of the committee's evidence deals with the efforts of the Polish Government in Exile to find traces which were acknowledged criminals.

Katyn. (See exhibit 17, pt. IV.)

400 were known to be alive, the next major trend of the committee's evidence was to look for these officers through Soviet prisons. General Anders also secured an interview with Premier Stalin in December 1945.

At this meeting, General Anders accompanied the head of the Polish Government in Exile, General Sikorski, and the Polish Ambassador in Moscow, Mr. Kot.

Stalin personally was asked about these missing Polish officers. The Soviet Premier insisted he was not detailing them nor did he have them.

General Anders testified in London before this committee:

"We inquired, "What, where could they have gone?" To this Stalin replied, "They escaped." We asked, "Where could they have escaped?" And Stalin replied, "To Manchuria." I said that this was impossible."

Anders had a second meeting with Stalin at the Krestin in Moscow on the 18th of March 1942. At this meeting with Stalin, Anders presented him with a list of missing Polish officers and told Stalin that none of the officers had as yet reported to the Polish Army.

Stalin replied, "Well, what good would they be to us? Why would we want to keep them or retaining them?" At this same meeting Stalin hinted that perhaps there could have been a number of men who had fled and become separated when the Russians invaded Russia.

It is noteworthy, however, when a committee member explicitly asked whether any Russian official at any time said that the Polish officers might have become German prisoners, General Anders replied: "Never." Anders testified: "This too was among the most disturbing factors because we knew that the Polish officers had made very long and lengthy and complete lists of all their prisoners."

The committee was not only not satisfied with the conversations with the highest Soviet officials regarding the missing Polish officers was independently verified by the testimony of General Anders, the first Polish Ambassador to Moscow under the new arrangement of July 1941.

VISHINSKY AND MOLOTOV QUESTIONED

Testifying in London, Kot said from the 20th of September 1941, until his departure from Moscow in the fall of 1942, he (Kot) made repeated inquiries to all levels of Soviet officialdom, to the NKVD, to Vishinsky, to Molotov, and even to Stalin himself, for information regarding these missing Polish officers. The committee, the conference between Kot and Deputy Foreign Minister Vishinsky on October 6, 1940, was characteristic of these meetings.

Kot complained to Vishinsky that only 2,000 Polish officers of an estimated 9,500 whose names were known to the Poles had reappeared among the Polish forces. Kot asked Vishinsky what had happened to the other officers saying:

"We must find these men; we must find them. We must ask the people of Poland where they could conceivably have been found."

Kot said that he did not see how thousands of men could disappear. Vishinsky never answered the question but parried it with a confused: "Well, what do you think happened to these men? We think they must be among the 300,000 Polish nationalists who have already been freed."

Kot raised the same question with Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov on October 22, 1941. Molotov put him off with the statement: "We will try to do everything possible."
Similarly, during the meeting with Stalin on November 14, 1941, when Kot emphasized the anxiety of the Poles regarding the list they had asked: "Are there still some Poles not released?" And stated: "Anxieties now begin to subside. We released all, even those people who were accused of destroying bridges and killing Soviet people, even those people were released by us."

It is worth noting that Stalin's categorical assertion was made several months after the Germans had over-run the Smolensk area; and still the Soviet leaders gave no indication that they even thought the Polish officers might have been captured by the Germans.

The diplomatic memoranda of the conversations between General Anders and Andrei Kot with Molotov, Vishinsky, and Stalin are part of this committee's record. They reveal any number of fictitious Soviet reasons why the Polish officers had not been located. Never once did these high Soviet officials, nor did any other Communist official of a high or low echelon, indicate to any of the Poles that those Polish prisoners of war might have been captured by the Germans.

It has been established by the record that the Polish Government in London employed its underground in Poland to check German prisoner-of-war camps to discover if any of these Russian-captured Poles might have been recaptured by the Germans. These efforts, like the negotiations in Russia, ended in negative results.

It was not until the Germans announced the discovery of the Katyn graves on April 13, 1943, that the Soviets first claimed these Polish prisoners had been moved into the Smolensk area in the spring of 1940. This evidence proves that the Soviet Government either was lying to the Poles during 1941 and 1942, when the Kremlin leaders said that they did not know where the prisoners of war might be, or else the Soviets were lying in their 1943 and 1944 reports, when they claimed that the Poles had been moved to the Smolensk area in the spring of 1940 and subsequently captured by the Germans in 1941.

ALL LETTERS RETURNED

The committee has testimony from a Special Family Bureau which had been established by the Polish Government in Gangi Gul, Russia, to try to trace the missing Polish officers.

Major General Kraczkowski and Capt. Eugen Lobomirski, Directors of this Family Bureau, testified in London that they personally had examined hundreds, virtually thousands of letters from relatives in Poland, inquiring about these missing officers. In every instance, they testified, each of the letters and post cards had stated that the last time the families heard from the Polish officers was in April and May of 1940.

These witnesses further testified that they had personally examined hundreds of letters addressed by the families to the prisoners interned in these three camps subsequent to May 1940, and all of these letters were returned by the Russian authorities with the inscription that the whereabouts of these Polish officers were unknown.

It is inconceivable that the highly developed bureaucracy of the Soviets would have permitted the NKVD to lose control of this immediate instruction for the release of 15,000 Polish officers after they had left the three camps in the Spring of 1940. (See testimony starting on p. 626, pt. IV.)

All of the foregoing testimony which the committee has heard from Anders, Kot, and Czapski was reported to the American colonel, Henry W. Szymanski, who was assistant United States military attaché at Cairo, Egypt. Szymanski testified that he was assigned in March of 1942 to be United States liaison officer with the Poles in Russia, but that he was never granted a visa to enter Russia.

Szymanski's specific assignment was to ascertain what had happened to the Polish officers in Russia, because the United States considered them essential to the Allied war effort. Consequently, Szymanski met with all the high-ranking Polish officers survivors as they came out of Russia during the latter part of 1942 and 1943, and he reported all of the foregoing testimony to the American Chief of Staff for G-2.

During the 22-month effort by the Poles to locate their missing officers, General Anders with his staff had carefully prepared a list of names of those who were interned in the three camps. This list was prepared on the basis of information supplied General Anders by the 400 survivors who were grouped at Grinovec.

During his conference with Stalin in December, General Sikorski personally handed the Russian premier a list bearing more than 3,000 names and detailed German information concerning the discovery of the bodies of many thousands of Polish officers near Smolensk and the categorical statement that they were murdered by the Soviet authorities in the spring of 1940, the necessity has arisen that the mass graves discovered should be investigated and the fact should be confirmed by a competent international body such as the International Red Cross. The Polish Government has therefore approached this institution with a view of their sending a delegation to the place where the mass graves of the Polish prisoners of war is said to have taken place.

V. DISCOVERY OF GRAVES AT KATYN

The Polish Government's search for the missing officers came to an abrupt end on April 13, 1943, when the following Berlin broadcast by the Germans shocked the world:

"From Smolensk comes news that the native population has revealed to German authorities the spot where in secret mass executions the Bolshevists murdered 10,000 Polish officers. German authorities made a horrible discovery. They found a pit 28 meters long and 16 meters wide in which, 12 deep, lay, the bodies of 3,000 Polish officers. In full uniform, in some cases shackled, all wounds from pistol bullets in the back of the neck. Search and discovery of other pits continue."

This German announcement was followed by an intense campaign of Nazi propaganda aimed at political exploitation of the discovery. German Foreign Office documents which were captured by the Allies and turned over to the United States and Britain for joint custody were traced by the committee in England. These documents which are included in part V of this committee's evidence are worth noting that Stalin's categorical assertion was made several months after the Soviets were lying to the Poles during 1941 and 1942, when they were murdered by the Soviet authorities in the spring of 1940, the necessity has arisen that the mass graves discovered should be investigated and the fact should be confirmed by a competent international body such as the International Red Cross. The Polish Government has therefore approached this institution with a view of their sending a delegation to the place where the mass graves of the Polish prisoners of war is said to have taken place.

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The testimony of the Swedish journalist Jaederlunt clearly established that he would have preferred to have considered the Katyn massacre as an atrocity. Mr. Jaederlunt concluded his testimony as follows:

"I was and I am absolutely convinced that the Russians committed it. I do not wish to say the Russians. I would rather amend it to the NKVD."

During the Chicago hearings, Commissar Skargunski reported on his official visit to the Katyn graves. This witness was the deputy chairman of the Polish Red Cross, and when he first informed them about the Katyn graves, refused to accept the German statement on the telephones that "this is a pure propaganda move, and the Red Cross must keep away from any propaganda.

Skargunski was directed by Polish Red Cross officials to go to Katyn to supervise the excavation and proper burial of these Polish soldiers. While at Katyn, the Polish Red Cross official was moved by the facts he personally witnessed to admit that the German Army in this instance was innocent. (See pt. III of the published hearings.)

American Army officers visit Katyn

The most significant testimony of the independent witnesses who visited Katyn shortly after the German announcement of the graves' discovery was provided by two American army officers, Lt. Col. Donald B. Stewart and Col. John H. Van Vlet, Jr.

These officers had been captured by the Germans in north Africa and were taken to Germany as prisoners of war. These two Americans with two British officers had been compelled by German authorities to visit Katyn in May 1943. Stewart's suspicions of the German purpose was indicated by his testimony to the effect that he was there [Katyn] under orders: that I felt the matter was a propaganda effort, and, in any event, it was a political effort. * * * I had no desire to have anything to do with a propaganda effort or a political matter.

(See pt. II of the published hearings.)

Similarly, Van Vlet in his written report stated:

"I hated the Germans. I didn't want to believe them. * * * When I became involved in the visit to Katyn I realized that the Germans would do their best to convince me that they were guilty. I made up my mind not to be convinced by what must be a propaganda effort. * * *"

In his oral testimony to the committee, Van Vlet stated:

"As a prisoner of war, I had a personal grudge against them [the Germans] and as an American army officer I had a professional grudge against them...So the German story which I did not want to believe. * * *

(See pt. II of the published hearings.)

It is particularly interesting to note that both officers independently emphasized the same convincing factor, which they both stated had not been brought to their attention by the Germans but which was an independent deduction from their own observations. This was the evident fact that the clearly undisputed corpses were clothed in winter attire which was in an excellent state of repair, showing practically no wear. The two officers also independently made the same observations about the condition of the boots of the Polish officers. In both instances the officers admitted that they would have been a strong indication of war in a German camp that clothing could not have remained in that condition if it had been worn by a prisoner of war.

Hence, Colonel Stewart stated:

"I can never forget. My decision was that those [Polish] men were killed by the Russians while they were prisoners of the Russians. * * *"

(See pt. I of the published hearings.)

In similar fashion Colonel Van Vlet in his oral testimony stated:

"If those Polish officers had been alive and in prison camp until the Germans overran Poland prior to 24 March 1940, and if the Germans had in fact killed those Polish officers, then by the very virtue of the fact that their clothes had been worn and their shoes had been walked in, they would show much more wear. * * *

Likewise in his written report, Van Vlet explicitly rejected the doctrine of convictions:

"The sum of circumstantial evidence, impressions formed at the time of looking at the graves, what I saw in peoples' faces—all force the conclusion that Russia did it."

(See pt. II of the published hearings.)
Zbigniew Rogowski, who testified in London, said he had been taken to Katyn by Germans in April of 1943. Rogowski at the time was a Polish prisoner of war interned at Woldenberg. He said not all the victims were shot in the head.

"Another even more interesting detail of our conversation with Stukowski was that although he was inclined to describe the whole case as a most dramatic incident from the Polish point of view—he had no idea where could have come from all these bodies of Polish officers. All he knew was what the local inhabitants had told him that they had been brought in transports arriving from the direction of Smolensk. As he already had in hand photographs and, I think, even originals of some of the letters and postcards found on the bodies he asked us whether we could explain why the address of Konieczki repeated itself so often on many of the cards. I told him in short what I knew about the camps of Konieczki, Ostaszewski, and Sterbicki and I closely watched his reaction to this piece of news. It was most lively and convinced me beyond all doubt that Stukowski had learned about Konieczki only from us. It was the only detail of our conversation on which he made a note. A moment later, after we had finished our talk, I heard him repeating the news about Konieczki to Olenbusch and to the other Germans. * * * (See p. 440, pt. IV of the published hearings.)

Thus, from the above-quoted testimony, it is evident that the Germans were the organizers of the camp in Russia where these Polish officers had been imprisoned during the period, September 1939 through May 1940.

VII. OTHER WITNESSES

This committee heard several witnesses whose testimony will be grouped under a special heading. Among these was a Pole who testified as an eyewitness to the massacre. His identity had to be concealed against his relatives still living in Poland. However, all the committee members were familiar with his identity.

Testifying as "John Doe" at the committee's second hearing in Washington, this witness maintained that he and two of his compatriots personally viewed the execution of 200 Polish officers in what he believed to be the Katyn Forest. These observations were made by the witness and his friends at the beginning of November after the trio escaped from a Russian prisoner-of-war camp at Pavlischew Bor. (See p. 143 of pt. II.)

When relating how the trio observed the Polish prisoners being led into the forest, the witness continued:

"Two of them [Russian soldiers] seized their hands and held them in back and one of the Russian soldiers lifted his chin up [the victim's] took him by the head, opened his mouth and shoved a handful of sawdust into his mouth. "John Doe" further stated he saw the Poles' hands being bound in the back while prior to the execution.

This witness introduced several new factors hitherto unknown to the committee: he said the executions he witnessed were in the early part of November; he said the victims' hands were bound with wire; he said their mouths were stuffed with sawdust; and he said some of the victims were left to suffocate rather than shot in the head. These observations, up to the time that John Doe testified, had never been published in any of the material prepared by the Polish Government during its lengthy research on the Katyn massacre. However, they were substantiated by witnesses appearing before this committee.

Colonel Grotschk, testifying in Washington, said groups of Polish officers were executed in Katyn as early as November. In London, Mr. Rowinski, the committee observer at the graves taken there as a German prisoner of war in 1943, testified he observed several victims with their mouths stuffed with sawdust. In Frankfort, Zbigniew Rogowski, a Polish International Medical Commission participant, testified several victims had their hands bound with wire. During the same hearings, Vladimir Kostuev, of Switzerland, and also on the same Commission, testified he believed some of the victims died of suffocation instead of gunshot wounds. Meanwhile, Dr. Henryk Boebiern observed the victims' mouths stuffed with sawdust and hands tied with wire.

This committee heard testimony of many witnesses whose revelations were of a most dramatic nature. In order to get the atmosphere surrounding the facts of the Katyn massacre, their testimony was accepted and placed in the record.

Among these was Jerry Lwonecki who testified in London. He said he was a Polish prisoner of war interned at the prison camp near Lubien. In 1943 he had occasion to discuss the Katyn massacre with Stalin's oldest son by a prior marriage who likewise was a German prisoner of war interned in the same camp. Lwonecki said he discussed the appearance of the Polish officers with Stalin's son who frankly admitted that the Poles were executed by the Soviets. "Why those were the intelligentsia, the most dangerous elements to us, and they had to be eliminated," Lwonecki quoted Stalin's son as saying. (See p. 177, pt. IV.)

During our latest hearing here in Washington, this committee heard testimony from Boris Osansky of New York, a former Soviet army officer who escaped to this country in 1946. Osansky related conversations he had in Moscow with N. N. Burdenko, director of the Special Soviet Commission which made an investigation for the Russians in January 1944. Burdenko supervised the exhumation of 925 bodies for the Soviet investigation and in the official report stated all of the Poles were executed in the autumn of 1941.

Osansky, testifying Burdenko told him the Soviet report was false. He quoted Burdenko as saying: "I was appointed by Stalin personally to go to the Katyn place. All the corpses were 40 years old. For me, as a medical man, this problem was quite clear. Our NKVD friends made a mistake."

Osansky further stated he was told by Burdenko that there are more Katyns in Russia.

"Katyn existed and are existing and will be existing," Osansky quoted Burdenko as stating in Moscow in April of 1944. "Anyone who still go and dig up things in our country, Russia, would find a lot of things that we have to destroy."

Dr. Vladimir Olesnicy, of New York, a former Soviet army officer, who escaped to the United States in 1946, testified in London. Dr. Olesnicy was a former Soviet military physician and he testified that he had been ordered to prepare an official report for Stalin on the Katyn massacre. During our latest hearing here in Washington, this committee heard testimony from the German International Medical Commission, composed of 12 doctors from 12 different countries of Europe. The committee heard testimony from 5 of these doctors.

The Germans formed an International Medical Commission, composed of the leading medical doctors, anatomists, and professors of criminology from 12 different countries of Europe. The committee heard testimony from 5 of these doctors.

Dr. Edward Lucas Miloslavich (Croatia). (Part III of the published hearings.)

Dr. Vincenzo Palmieri (Italy). (Part V of the published hearings.)

Dr. Franco Navig (Switzerland). (Part V of the published hearings.)

Dr. Vincenzo Maro Palieri (Italy).

All of the above-named doctors categorically and unequivocally stated to the committee that they had complete freedom of action in performing whatever scientific investigation they desired. Also, that they had complete freedom to investigate as 'they wished, and that they considered appropriate.

Their unanimous conclusion was that the Poles were murdered at least 3 years ago—thus placing the time of death as the spring of 1940 when the Katyn area was under Soviet control.

Dr. Transen presented as an exhibit for the committee the original protocol signed by 12 doctors in their own handwriting. He also presented a photograph of the 12 doctors signing the protocol to prove that there was no duress.
THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE

Dr. Orso, Dr. Naville, and Dr. Tramsen definitely identified this protocol and stated that they had signed it and that they were of the same opinion today as they were when they signed this protocol on April 30, 1943.

Dr. Mikołajewicz gave the following testimony to the committee relative to the collection of the bodies as they were found in the mass graves:

"One body was placed on top of the other one, with their faces down. They were all covered; nothing between them. All the bodies were dressed in Polish officers' uniforms, the clothing being winter clothing, underwear, and the uniforms; and coats on some. The heads were downward. One body like this, the next one like this (indicating). This was the width of the grave. Then 12 layers down, and then multiply by the length. I didn't follow any advice because I knew what to do. I estimated approximately 2,500, something like that, a little less than 3,000 officers. They were packed completely together by decaying fluids of the human body, the decomposing fluids, which started to penetrate, to libiibe, to infiltrate every dead body in there. That was a solid mass in which you just saw skulls you could recognize and that they were human beings.

"Then I went into the graves and studied which ones of them would give me the best information, what the dead body could tell us. With the help of two Russian peasants I picked a body, and slowly and gradually—It took them one hour—they removed the body and brought it out. I examined it very carefully to find out two main points. First, what was the cause of death. Second, the day they left Katyn and voluntarily offered these items to the Germans, because when the Soviet declined this committee's invitation to participate in the investigation, they maintained that their own report conclusively established the Germans were responsible for the Katyn massacre.

It is interesting to see how the Soviet's official findings stand up under the light of facts uncovered by this committee. At the very outset, the Soviet claim is incongruous with the facts. The Soviet's quote Russian natives who allegedly saw Polish officers working on road gangs and construction projects in the Smolensk area prior to the German invasion. These witnesses are quoted to substantiate the Soviet allegation that all the officers were transferred from Kovel, Starobelsk, and Gienieczyn by the Russians in March and April 1940 to three camps in the Smolensk area designated only as ONI, ONZ, and ONS. If the Polish officers worked on road-gangs as the Russians maintain—it is logical to ask if their boots and uniforms would have shown as little wear as Colonel Van Vliet observed when he examined their bodies in Katyn.

While conducting hearings in London, this committee was fortunate in obtaining the testimony of Mr. Joseph Mackiewicz, who visited the Katyn Forest on instructions of the Polish Underground in May 1943 and observed the German examinations. Mr. Mackiewicz is an authority on the Katyn massacre having testified before the United Nations committee and Naville for the past 9 years. Some of his observations (starring on p. s.e. of part IV) follow:

1. That there had taken from Polish bodies in Katyn at the time of the individual autopsies. Both of these doctors had preserved this material since the days they left Katyn and from that time onwards.

2. That all of this material has been made permanent and may be found as exhibits in part V of the published hearings.

3. That no defendant had stated as follows:

"In the bodies, at least in many of the bodies, Professor Orso observed the presence of growth (corps-auxiliar). The majority of them had just one shot, because it entered in here [pointing with finger] and came out here at the root of the neck, which means the head was bent downward. It was administered with such precision that the medulla was completely destroyed. (See pt. III of the published hearings.)"

4. The German International Medical Commission's protocol which they had signed on April 30, 1943 mentioned the following testimony of Dr. Orso, Dr. Tramsen, etc.--there is contained the testimony of five international doctors. Categorical statements are made by all five doctors who testified before this committee that all

IX. RUSSIAN REPORT

While the testimony heard by this committee is conclusive in itself to establish that the Polish officers were massacred by the Soviets, nothing appears as incongruous with the facts as the Russian communique does not specify exactly where were those three camps. Naturally, the number of potential witnesses in Poland who could have been summoned to testify that they had corresponded with any members of their family in these camps up to and including 1941 would have reached the figure, roughly, of 20,000 to 30,000. The Germans, who had, of course, capitalized on a tremendous propaganda to make even an average person take consideration the fact that, in a country where the people were generally adversely disposed toward the Germans, the news that the Germans had lied they would have certainly spread quickly through Poland, and the Germans would have never permitted themselves to be compromised to that extent."
the Russian command either failed to take the prisoners' fate into account or did not wish to.

Statements taken by the committee here in Washington, from a former high Soviet official assigned to the Russian Foreign Office during World War II, also established that Russian prisoners of war were not to fall into enemy hands under any circumstances.

Mackiewicz's comment on this point was:

"As an example, when I was in Katyn, there were with me two Portuguese correspondents. One of these men told me that he had been taken to look at a little village, to which the Germans had taken him, and then he asked me if they actually were massacred in August and September of 1941. None of these men reported in their original Polish uniforms and then characteristic four-cornered hats. This committee has photographs of the graves of the 500 Russians ever were found.

The committee had testimony presented in London which clearly spelled out that Russian prisoners of war were not to fall into the hands of the Germans at all costs.

It happened, which is also significant to note that while not a single Russian witness, including T. E. Fatkov, testifies that round-ups of the Polish prisoners were continued and no one saw Polish prisoner again.

If this is true, and it must be true, since it is in the Russian's own report, why then were so many Polish prisoners found in winter garb in the Katyn Forest? Weather reports show that the temperatures during August and September of 1941 ranged between 65 and 75 degrees Fahrenheit. It is inconceivable that the Polish prisoners of war would have had scarfs tied around their necks and would be wearing overcoats if they actually were massacred in August and September of 1941.

Russian witnesses further testified that they knew the men they saw were Polish prisoners. Since he was unsuccessful in obtaining these railroad cars, consequently these Polish prisoners fell into the hands of the Germans, but Witosznikow himself remained with the Russians and did not fall into captivity of the Germans. Therefore, if Witosznikow, who was the commanding officer of the security forces, knew about the whereabouts of these soldiers, why did not Stassin and Molotov and Vischinsky know about their presence virtually within the shadow of Moscow? And as a consequence, for 2 years they ostentatiously searched to find an answer as to the whereabouts of these soldiers. Witosznikow certainly must have reported to his superiors as to what happened to these prisoners, and when Czapkie made his frequent inquiries to the NKVD, they would have immediately told him that these men fell captive to the Germans.

"Assuming that Witosznikow could not get the rail cars from Iwawnow as he had requested, he could have evacuated the soldiers from these prison camps by foot, especially when you consider that the claim is that Witosznikow appealed to Iwawnow for these cars on the 12th of July; but the official Soviet communiqué of the 23rd of July, 1941, claimed that the Russians were still in control and possession of Smolensk."

The Russians further claim their Polish camps were near the Gussino line and that trains could not be sent because that line already was under fire. If, in fact, these three camps were established that Russian prisoners of war were not to fall into anybody's hands under any circumstances.

Furthermore, the Russian report claims that the Polish prisoners were not subjected to questioning by the Germans. It is true and it must be true, since it is in the Russian's own report, why then were any of these Polish prisoners found in winter garb in the Katyn Forest? Weather reports show that the temperatures during August and September of 1941 ranged between 65 and 75 degrees Fahrenheit. It is inconceivable that the Polish prisoners of war would have had scarfs tied around their necks and would be wearing overcoats if they actually were massacred in August and September of 1941.

The Russians claim that Witosznikow, who had testified before the German Commission, had been brutally beaten to say that he actually had seen and witnessed the executions. The Germans never claimed to have an 'eyewitness'. Any allegations which the Russians attribute to Kisseluv, therefore, are false.

The Soviet report is inconsistent with the facts in its claim there were 11,000 Polish prisoners massacred at Katyn. The Polish Red Cross has definitely and conclusively established in the minds of this committee that there were no more than 4,141 bodies exhumed at Katyn, and another 119 found but not exhumed. The Polish Red Cross had made a thorough search of the area in order to find more graves and no additional graves or bodies could be found.

Out of some 11,000 bodies which the Russians claim that they had found in Katyn, they were able to find only nine documents which showed a date later than May of 1940.

RUSSIAN REPORT CONTRADICTORY

Furthermore, the Russian report quotes a citizen, Moskovoskaya, who claims she talked to a man named Yegorov in March of 1943. He reportedly said that in March of 1943 he had been sent into the Katyn Forest by the Germans to remove all documents which were dated subsequent to May of 1940 from the bodies of the dead soldiers. It is interesting to note that her conversation was in March of 1943, while the alleged four-cornered hats. This committee has photographs of the graves of the 500 Russians ever were found.

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"Mr. Genschow. Yes; is that the case?"

"Mr. Genschow. Yes; it could; because it was a standard type cartridge which was used in many different rifles and no German officer or police man ever used it."

"Mr. Genschow. Yes, certainly."

"Mr. Genschow. Was it used internationally by various nations, police, or armed forces, in pistols?"

"Mr. Genschow. Yes, certainly.

"Mr. Genschow. Did this firm ever export this ammunition of the caliber 7.65 to European countries?"

"Mr. Genschow. Yes; that is the case."

From the foregoing testimony it is evident that both Russia and Germany had access to this type of ammunition.

Finally, this committee cannot accept the Russian claim that these Polish officers were taken prisoner by the Germans while their Russian guards themselves fled the legitimate German onslaught. There should be no doubt that the moment the Russian soldiers abandoned the camps the 15,000 Poles likewise would have fled for freedom. X. NUREMBERG

This committee reports that during the International Military Trials held in Nuremberg after World War II, evidence was heard relative to the Katyn massacre.

The committee has heard testimony from two of the attorneys who participated in the Nuremberg trials. (See p. 247, pt. II of the published hearings.) In accordance with the London agreement of 1945, the Soviets were in charge of war crimes which had allegedly been committed in the eastern parts of Russia, Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. Hence the Katyn massacre, since it occurred in Soviet territory, was the direct responsibility of the Government of the U. S. R. R. to prosecute the individuals responsible for this crime.

The Katyn massacre appears in the Nuremberg trials as a charge against Hermann Goering since he was the highest ranking German officer. The Soviet prosecutor produced three witnesses to establish the Germany guilt for the Katyn massacre. The German defense counsel produced three witnesses for the defense. These are all the witnesses the tribunal would hear. Witnesses for both the Germans and the Soviets were duly examined and cross-examined.

This committee in the course of the hearings was presented with several witnesses from the three German witnesses who appeared at Nuremberg, that is, Colonel Bedenk, General Oberhaeuser, and Lieutenant Von Eichhorn. (See p. V of the published hearings.)

These witnesses testified that they were with German Signal Regiment 337, of the Five hundred and thirty-seven Engineer Battalion as alleged in the Russian report. (See p. 247, pt. II of the published hearings.)

SOVIETS FAIL TO PROVE CASE AT NUREMBERG

All of them arrived in the Smolensk area after September 1, 1941. In the case of Colonel Ahrens, he testified that he did not arrive in the Katyn Forest until early November 1941. He was specifically named in the Russian report as the individual who directed the mass shootings of the Polish prisoners. (See p. 247, pt. III of the published hearings.) Colonel Ahrens was again accused before the International Military Tribunal by the Soviet prosecutor and it is significant to note that he was never indicted by the tribunal nor was his indictment requested by the Soviet prosecutor. (See p. V of the published hearings.)

This committee heard testimony from Col. Albert Bedenk who was the predecessor to Colonel Ahrens as commanding officer of Signal Regiment 337. He testified that he arrived in the Smolensk area on July 28, 1941, several days after the bloody fighting front had moved many miles east of Smolensk on the way to Moscow. Colonel Bedenk set up the headquarters of Signal Regiment 337 in the Dnieper Castle about the middle of August 1941. He testified: "the total strength of the regiment at that time was 17, of which 5 or 6 were officers, 4 were
any knowledge of the whereabouts of their officers when, in fact, the Poles already were buried in the mass graves at Katyn.

7. The Soviets have demonstrated through their highly organized propaganda machinery that they fear to have the people behind the iron curtain know the truth about Katyn. This is proven by their reaction to our committee's efforts and the amount of newspaper space and radio time devoted to denouncing the work of our committee. They also republished in all newspapers behind the iron curtain the allegedly "neutral" Russian report of 1944. The world-wide campaign of slander by the Soviets against our committee is also consistent as another effort to block this investigation.

8. This committee believes that one of the reasons for the staging of the recent Soviet "germ warfare" propaganda campaign was to divert attention of the people behind the iron curtain from the hearings of the committee.

9. Our committee has been petitioned to investigate mass executions and crimes against humanity committed in other countries behind the iron curtain. The committee has heard testimony which indicates there are other "Katyns." We wish to impress with all the means at our command that the investigation of the Katyn massacre barely scratches the surface of numerous crimes against humanity perpetrated by totalitarian powers. This committee believes that an international tribunal should be established to investigate and punish such crimes.

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INDEX OF WITNESSES

A. Mr. 824, 532, 571
Albrect, Friedrich 1257, 1251
Allgayer, Erwin 1500
Anderson, Gen. Wladyslaw 1051
B. Mr. 695
Beck, Werner Dr. 1511
Bednark, Albert Col. 1249
Beissel, Gen. Clayton 1335, 1336, 2286
Brown, Gen. H., Jr. 2060, 2218
Bless, Hans 1416, 1417
Bobrowski-Szymanski, Lt. Gen. Zygmunt Peter 656
Bor-Komorowski, Lt. Gen. Tadeusz 705
Braun, Father Leopold 182
C. Mr. 790
Carter, John F. 2248
Casidy, Henry Clarence 2174, 2272
Cavay, Josef 1579
Davis, Elmer 144
Dix, John 144
Dix, John #2 698
Erle, George Howard 2199
Eschen, Julius 2296
Escher, Vasilii 375
Fazeyn, Tadeusz 634
Furtak, Wladyslaw 598
Garliowski, Josef 277
Gawlik, Marlon (Mike) 75
Ganschow, Karl 1377
Gerdis, Ferdinand 799
Groblicki, George 161
Hedrick, W. A. 2700
Hemm, Karl 1500
Holmes, Julius C. 820
Hopkins, James F. 2008
Jackson, Justice Robert H. 1945
Jadecky, Christer 1337
Kaczowski, Maj 628, 696
Kawkowski, Wladyslaw 1967
Kempner, Robert Dr. 1534
Knoop, Mrs. Janina 618
Korth, Fred 416
Kotler, V. 358
Kramer, Rudolf 1598
Kreutzer, John Marion 2292
Kuikel, Lt. Gen. Marian 788
Lane, Arthur Bliss 2016, 2017
Langer, Joseph 2002, 2019
Lantaff, Hon. William C. 1827
Lawescki, Jerry 775
Lubotzkecki, Col. Stanislaw 611
Lubomirski, Capt. Eugeniusz 622
Lukiewicz, Jerzy 551, 550, 779, 842
Laszczynski, Zugmunt 614
Lyons, Frederick R. 650
Mackiewicz, Joseph 867
Meeren, Mildred 1583
Melby, John F. 2149
Metcalf, Mrs. Irene Hajduk 325
Miloszuk, Stanislaw 2185
Miloslavich, Dr. Edward Lucas 710
Mynarski, Bronislav 340
Mortimer, Kathleen H. 2132
Moszynski, Adam 648
Napier, Dr. Francois 1902
Oberhaeuser, Gen. Eugene 1283, 1299
Olchansky, Boris 1939
Orson, Fr. Ferrin 1597
Palmieri, Dr. Vencio Marie 1617
Pfeiffer, Albert 1319
Phillips, Joseph H. 839
Podlaski, Roman 803
Raczykowski, Edward 2035
Riechardt, Robert K. 110
Romer, Tadeusz 119
Rowinski, Zdzislk 338
Sawczynski, Adam 771
Shea, Mrs. Hilda 2064
Simon, Arthur 2007, 2019
Smoczynski, Casimir 364, 367
Skarzynski, Matey 1574
Solor, Casimer 2029
Sokolowski, Moczydlew 338
Stahmer, Dr. Otto 1549
Standley, Admiral William H. 2042, 2098
Stephan, Werner 1246
Stewart, Col. Donald 1337
Sweet, Dr. Paul 302
Szadzi, Jan Prawdzic 785
Skrysmiw, Tadeusz 320
Tramser, Col. Holger 1429, 1475, 1551
Van Vliet, Col. John H. 52
Vogeloph, Paul 1329
Vott, Roman 638
Voelklein, Reinhardt 1291
Vor Gerloff, Rudolph 303
Vor Hartke, Fritz 537
W. Mr. 1232
Welles, Hon. Sumner 638
Wolowek, Gen. Jerry 1916, 2208
Zakrzewski, Stefan 793
Ziets, Dr. Wilhelm 1485

THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE

Knopp, Mrs. Janina 618
Korth, Fred 416
Kotler, V. 358
Kramer, Rudolf 1598
Kreutzer, John Marion 2292
Kuikel, Lt. Gen. Marian 788
Lane, Arthur Bliss 2016, 2017
Langer, Joseph 2002, 2019
Lantaff, Hon. William C. 1827
Lawescki, Jerry 775
Lubotzkecki, Col. Stanislaw 611
Lubomirski, Capt. Eugeniusz 622
Lukiewicz, Jerzy 551, 550, 779, 842
Laszczynski, Zugmunt 614
Lyons, Frederick R. 650
Mackiewicz, Joseph 867
Meeren, Mildred 1583
Melby, John F. 2149
Metcalf, Mrs. Irene Hajduk 325
Miloszuk, Stanislaw 2185
Miloslavich, Dr. Edward Lucas 710
Mynarski, Bronislav 340
Mortimer, Kathleen H. 2132
Moszynski, Adam 648
Napier, Dr. Francois 1902
Oberhaeuser, Gen. Eugene 1283, 1299
Olchansky, Boris 1939
Orson, Fr. Ferrin 1597
Palmieri, Dr. Vencio Marie 1617
Pfeiffer, Albert 1319
Phillips, Joseph H. 839
Podlaski, Roman 803
Raczykowski, Edward 2035
Riechardt, Robert K. 110
Romer, Tadeusz 119
Rowinski, Zdzislk 338
Sawczynski, Adam 771
Shea, Mrs. Hilda 2064
Simon, Arthur 2007, 2019
Smoczynski, Casimir 364, 367
Skarzynski, Matey 1574
Solor, Casimer 2029
Sokolowski, Moczydlew 338
Stahmer, Dr. Otto 1549
Standley, Admiral William H. 2042, 2098
Stephan, Werner 1246
Stewart, Col. Donald 1337
Sweet, Dr. Paul 302
Szadzi, Jan Prawdzic 785
Skrysmiw, Tadeusz 320
Tramser, Col. Holger 1429, 1475, 1551
Van Vliet, Col. John H. 52
Vogeloph, Paul 1329
Vott, Roman 638
Voelklein, Reinhardt 1291
Vor Gerloff, Rudolph 303
Vor Hartke, Fritz 537
W. Mr. 1232
Welles, Hon. Sumner 638
Wolowek, Gen. Jerry 1916, 2208
Zakrzewski, Stefan 793
Ziets, Dr. Wilhelm 1485
### EXHIBITS IN PART I HEARINGS HELD IN WASHINGTON, D. C., OCTOBER 11, 1951

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exhibit</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Picture of Russian village near Smolensk, Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Picture of the old city wall at Smolensk, Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>British bodies of Polish prisoners in graves at Kuty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Part of American-British group taken to Kuty in May 1943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Ceremony performed by German doctor and witnessed by American British group at Kuty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>American-British officers around autopsy table at Kuty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Colonel Van Vliet, Captain Gilder, Lieutenant Colonel Stevenson, the Russian priest, and a German from the Ministry of Information</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### EXHIBITS IN PART II HEARINGS HELD IN WASHINGTON, D. C., FEBRUARY 4, 5, 6, AND 7, 1952

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exhibit</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel Van Vliet's receipt for registered article</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Radiogram from Lieutenant Colonel Van Vliet to congressional committee and the reply</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### EXHIBITS IN PART III HEARINGS HELD IN (CHICAGO, ILL.), MARCH 13 AND 14, 1952

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exhibit</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Letter from Mr. Madsen to Soviet Ambassador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Letter from Mr. Madsen to Hon. Dean G. Acheson, Secretary of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Letter from Jack K. McFall, Assistant Secretary of State, to Mr. Madsen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Memorandum from Soviet Embassy (translation and original) transmitting report of Special Commission for Ascertaining and Investigating Circumstances of Shooting of Polish Officer Prisoners, etc. (translation and original)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Official German photo showing corpses of Polish Army officers stacked in uncovered graves at Kuty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Letter from Dr. W. Gęrczycki, director, Polish Red Cross, to International Red Cross, War Prisoners Agency, Geneva</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Report of Polish Red Cross (translation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Report of Technical Commission, Polish Red Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Letter from F. Shackelford, Counselor, Department of the Army, to Mr. Mitchell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Report on Polish-Russian Relations by Lt. Col. Henry I. Szymanski to Chief, Military Intelligence Service</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### EXHIBITS IN PART IV HEARINGS HELD IN LONDON, ENGLAND, APRIL 16, 17, 18, 19, 22, 23

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exhibit</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Photo of prisoners of war camp at Kozelsk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>List of prisoners at Kozelsk, Starobelsk, and Ostashkov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Returned to witness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Returned to witness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Statement of Witness A (original and translation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Record of the hearing of Witness A (original and translation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7, 8, 9, 10, and 11</td>
<td>Letters to Witness A from members of his family</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Postcard received by Mrs. Knopp from her husband</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Transcription of exhibit 12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### THE KATYN FOREST MASSACRE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exhibit</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Postcard to Tadeusz Knopp from Eugenia Zawieruch (original and translation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Deposition of Captain Lubenierski (original and translation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Letter from Władysław Sikorski to Ambassador Bogomolov (original and translation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Certificate of an insinuation against typhus submitted by General Molotov to Mr. Ryczynski (original and translation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Note of January 28, 1942, from Mr. Raczyński, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Ambassador Bogomolov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Polish-Soviet relations, 1918-43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Note of March 13, 1942, from Ambassador Bogomolov to Mr. Raczyński, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Note of April 20, 1943, from Mr. Raczyński, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Mr. Bogomolov, Ambassador of the U.S.S.R.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Statement of Polish Government, April 17, 1943, concerning discovery of graves of Polish officers near Smolensk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Photo of cord identified as a piece which was removed from the body of one of the victims found dead in Katyn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>23A, 24, 34A, and 34B. Notes written by Mr. Rownski after visit to Katyn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Translation of radiograms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Translation of radiograms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Translation of radiograms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Diary (original and translation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28A</td>
<td>Diary (original and translation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Returned to witness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Conversation of Lieutenant General Kükle, Polish Minister of War, with Soviet Ambassador Bogomolov (original and translation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30A</td>
<td>Conversations issued by Polish Minister of National Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30B</td>
<td>30C, 30D, 30E. Correspondence from International Red Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Copy of order found on body of Russian officer (translated into Polish)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Published in a separate volume, part 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Published in a separate volume, part 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Returned to witness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Translation of Komarinski report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35A</td>
<td>Translation of Komsarnski report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Returned to witness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Map of Kuty and report of Polish Red Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Returned to witness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Returned to witness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Returned to witness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>Report of Dr. Fegyndy Goetel on visit to Katyn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>Report of Mrs. Janina Dewidow-Mulenska</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>Returned to witness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>Returned to witness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>Proclamation to Polish soldiers by Marshal Timoshenko, Soviet military commander (original and translation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>Returned to witness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>List of missing officers at Katyn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>Minutes of conference between Dr. Kot, Polish Ambassador to Moscow, and Mr. Vishinsky, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, September 20, 1941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>Conversations between Dr. Kot and Mr. Vishinsky, October 6, 1941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Returned to witness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>Minutes of conversation of Ambassador Kot with J. Stalin, November 14, 1941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>Minutes of conversation between Gen. Władysław Sikorski and Joseph Stalin, December 3, 1941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>Returned to witness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>Memorandum concerning Polish prisoners of war (original and translation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>Returned to witness</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
51A, Telegram from J. Stalin to General Anders (original and translation)...

52. Minister of conversation between General Anders and J. Stalin....

53. Russian agreement to permit evacuation of Poles to Middle East (original and translation)...

EXHIBITS IN PART V HEARINGS HELD IN FRANKFURT, GERMANY, APRIL 21, 22, 25, 24, 25, AND 26, 1952

1. Returned to witness.


1-B. Translation of Russian memorandum...

2. Letter of invitation from Katyn committee to Federal Republic of Germany...

2-A. Transmittal letter of Department of State covering German diplomatic mission reply to committee...

2-B. Reply to committee invitation by diplomatic mission of the Federal Republic of Germany...

3. Delegation inspecting group of corpses...

3-A. Inspection of bodies by International Commission at Katyn...

3-B. Delegation inspecting group of corpses at German exhumations...

3-C. No exhibit 6 due to incorrect numbering.

3-D. Professor Orsos of Hungary examining corpse at German exhumations...

3-E. German official discussing Katyn with delegation of journalists.

3-F. American and British prisoners of war talking to a Russian native.

3-G. Russian worker with Polish Red Cross Director Skarzyński and others.

3-H. Group of German soldiers-members of an identification squad at Katyn.

3-I. Site of mass graves before exhumations...

3-J. Corpses of German soldiers near Katyn.

3-K. Dedicated graves of reburied Katyn victims.

3-L. Page of a Polish officer's pay book...

3-M. Lieutenant Voss showing possessions of victims.

3-N. Reburial place for Polish murdered.

3-O. No exhibit 15 due to incorrect numbering.

3-P. German officer, Lieutenant Vogelpoth (witness at German hearings) discussing growth of grass, possibly at Katyn.

3-Q. Delegation inspecting group of corpses.

3-R. German Foreign Office memorandum of conversation with Goebbels concerning the discovery of Katyn graves, April 15, 1943...

3-S. Captured German war document with translation...

3-T. Captured German war document with translation...

3-U. Captured German war document with translation...

3-V. Captured German war document with translation...

3-W. Captured German war document with translation...

3-X. Captured German war document with translation...

3-Y. Captured German war document with translation...

3-Z. Captured German war document with translation...

4. No exhibit 69 due to incorrect numbering.

4-A. Dr. Orsos (Hungary) indicating body to be exhumed and its removal.

4-B. Dr. Orsos (Hungary) and Professor Saxen (Finland) examining bodies.

4-C. Professor Hajek holding arm of Katyn victim...

4-D. Arrival of International Commission at Katyn...

4-E. Colonel Abreu giving expert report.

4-F. Laboratory in German institute at Smolensk, Professor Miloslavich holding skull.

4-G. Cap insignia of Polish victim.

4-H. Mobilization notice and identification slip of Polish officer.

4-I. Stamp collection of a Katyn victim.

4-J. Polish złoty (currency found on body of a Katyn victim).

4-K. Polish coins found on exhumed body.

4-L. No published. Exhibit filed with committee.

4-M. Roll call list of Katyn with notation "Kostielc, 12 April 1940"...

4-N. No exhibit 69 due to incorrect numbering.

4-O. Dr. Orsos (Hungary) performing autopsy being watched by Polish officers.

4-P. Polish officer's diary.

4-Q. Polish officer's diary.

4-R. Polish officer's diary.

4-S. Members of committee cleaning past Dnieper Castle in Katyn Forest.

4-T. Cap insignia of Polish victim.

4-U. Mobilization notice and identification slip of Polish officer.

4-V. Stamp collection of a Katyn victim.

4-W. Polish złoty (currency found on body of a Katyn victim).

4-X. Polish coins found on exhumed body.

4-Y. No published. Exhibit filed with committee.

4-Z. Roll call list of Katyn with notation "Kostielc, 12 April 1940"...

5. No exhibit 69 due to incorrect numbering.

5-A. Dr. Orsos (Hungary) and Professor Saxen (Finland) examining bodies.

5-B. Professor Hajek holding arm of Katyn victim...

5-C. Arrivals of International Commission at Katyn...

5-D. Colonel Abreu giving expert report.

5-E. Laboratory in German institute at Smolensk, Professor Miloslavich holding skull.

5-F. Cap insignia of Polish victim.

5-G. Mobilization notice and identification slip of Polish officer.

5-H. Stamp collection of a Katyn victim.

5-I. Polish złoty (currency found on body of a Katyn victim).

5-J. Polish coins found on exhumed body.

5-K. No published. Exhibit filed with committee.

5-L. Roll call list of Katyn with notation "Kostielc, 12 April 1940"...

5-M. No exhibit 69 due to incorrect numbering.

5-N. Dr. Orsos (Hungary) performing autopsy being watched by Polish officers.

5-O. Polish officer's diary.

5-P. Polish officer's diary.

5-Q. Polish officer's diary.

5-R. Members of committee cleaning past Dnieper Castle in Katyn Forest.

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5-T. Mobilization notice and identification slip of Polish officer.

5-U. Stamp collection of a Katyn victim.

5-V. Polish złoty (currency found on body of a Katyn victim).

5-W. Polish coins found on exhumed body.

5-X. No published. Exhibit filed with committee.

5-Y. Roll call list of Katyn with notation "Kostielc, 12 April 1940"...

5-Z. No exhibit 69 due to incorrect numbering.

6. No exhibit 69 due to incorrect numbering.

6-A. Dr. Orsos (Hungary) indicating body to be exhumed and its removal.

6-B. Dr. Orsos (Hungary) and Professor Saxen (Finland) examining bodies.

6-C. Professor Hajek holding arm of Katyn victim...

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6-I. Stamp collection of a Katyn victim.

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6-V. Stamp collection of a Katyn victim.

6-W. Polish złoty (currency found on body of a Katyn victim).

6-X. Polish coins found on exhumed body.

6-Y. No published. Exhibit filed with committee.

6-Z. Roll call list of Katyn with notation "Kostielc, 12 April 1940"...
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EXHIBITS IN PART VI HEARINGS HELD IN LONDON, ENGLAND, APRIL 16, 17, 18, AND 19, 1942</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>32. Polish report of prisoners murdered in Katyn</td>
<td>2023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33. Supplemental material compiled by the Polish Government in exile in London</td>
<td>1802</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EXHIBITS IN PART VII HEARINGS HELD IN WASHINGTON, D. C., JUNE 3, 4, AND NOVEMBER 11, 12, 13, AND 14, 1942</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Letter to Mr. Muddon from Gen. J. Lawton Collins</td>
<td>1820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Memorandum from General Bissell (Roger Kent, general counsel for Charles A. Coolidge)</td>
<td>1840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Letter from General Bissell to Julius C. Holmes, Assistant Secretary of State</td>
<td>1867</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Letter from Julius C. Holmes to General Bissell</td>
<td>1894</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Statement by Mr. Justice Robert H. Jackson to the congressional committee</td>
<td>1971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Mr. Elmer Davis' radio broadcast of May 3, 1943</td>
<td>1987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8A. State Department memorandum, with stamp mark, showing it had been delivered to Mr. Berle on April 22, 1943</td>
<td>1988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Telegram from Ambassador Standley to Department of State</td>
<td>2045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Portion of message from Secretary of State Hull to American Ambassador at Kulyshoe of August 19, 1942</td>
<td>2046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Portion of message from Secretary of State to American Ambassador dated September 5, 1942</td>
<td>2049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Portion of message from American Ambassador to State Department dated September 10, 1942</td>
<td>2052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Report from American Ambassador at Moscow regarding Wilkis' conversation with Stalin concerning the Polish situation</td>
<td>2054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Letter and one enclosure forwarded to State Department by American Ambassador to Moscow on February 17, 1942, detailing search for Polish officers</td>
<td>2057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Telegram from Moscow dated April 28, 1943</td>
<td>2062</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Stalin's personal letter to President F. D. Roosevelt</td>
<td>2063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Message from President Roosevelt to Stalin dated April 28, 1943</td>
<td>2064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Telegram from Ambassador in Moscow to Department of State</td>
<td>2066</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Telegram from Ambassador in Moscow to Department of State</td>
<td>2068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Letter from Under Secretary Sumner Welles to President Roosevelt</td>
<td>2076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Letter to General Watson from Under Secretary Welles</td>
<td>2082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Report and evidence compiled by Poles regarding discovery at Katyn forwarded to Under Secretary Sumner Welles by Ambassador Bidle on May 30, 1943</td>
<td>2082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Message from Mr. Harriman to Stalin dated November 7, 1941</td>
<td>2112</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>